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ORIGINALISM AND SECOND-ORDER IPSE DIXIT 
REASONING IN CHISHOLM V. GEORGIA  
D. A. JEREMY TELMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article presents a new perspective on the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence during the Early Republic. It focuses on what I am calling second-order 
ipse dixit reasoning, which occurs when Justices have to decide between two 
incommensurable interpretive modalities. If first-order ipse dixit is unreasoned 
decision-making, second-order ipse dixit involves an unreasoned choice between or 
among two or more equally valid interpretive options. The early Court often had 
recourse to second-order ipse dixit because methodological eclecticism characterized 
its constitutional jurisprudence, and the early Court established no fixed hierarchy 
among interpretive modalities.  
Chisholm, the pre-Marshall Court’s most important constitutional decision, 
illustrates second-order ipse dixit reasoning. The Justices issued their opinions 
seriatim, and they did not engage with one another’s reasoning. As a result, the Court 
issues a ruling, but there is no agreement as to the basis for that ruling. Rather, the 
Justices present us with five separate legal essays in which they ruminate on the nature 
of sovereignty and its relationship to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
Scholarly engagement with the constitutional jurisprudence of the early Court has 
gained new urgency because originalist scholars have recently claimed that 
originalism informed the early Court’s approach to constitutional interpretation. This 
Article finds that contemporary filters do not capture the essence of eighteenth-century 
constitutional adjudication. Like modern textualists, the Justices of the Chisholm 
Court begin their inquiries with an examination of the constitutional text. However, 
the constitutional text rarely provided clear constraints on the early Court’s discretion 
because, to borrow language from New Originalists, their cases arose in the “zone of 
construction” where original meaning “runs out.” Justices chose among plausible 
arguments about the Constitution’s meaning. At key points, the Justices simply 
declared what the law was. They did so, not without justification, but also not based 
on evidence of the Framers’ intent or the original meaning of the constitutional text.  
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION OF ORIGINALISM IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
Most scholarship on originalism, written both by originalists and non-originalists, 
acknowledges that the movement was a response to the perceived excesses of the 
Warren and Burger Courts.1 Until recently, most originalists recognized that 
originalism is a twentieth-century invention, not without its historical antecedents, but 
not realized as a comprehensive approach to interpretation until about 200 years after 
                                                          
 1  See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism and the 
Interpretation of “This Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1261 (1987) (noting that after the 
1950s, “judicial conservatives became uncomfortable with the naked exercises of raw judicial 
power employed by a federal judiciary that had come to accept the realists’ vision of the judicial 
role”); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 247 (2009) 
(explaining that the “sweeping decisions of the Warren Court” led conservatives to insist that 
“the Constitution be interpreted to give effect to the intent of the framers”); Stephen M. Griffin, 
Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1188 (2008) (observing that originalism 
“was driven by concerns that the Warren and Burger Courts had gone too far,” particularly in 
the realms of substantive due process and equal protection); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, 
Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 
550–54 (2006) (describing modern conservative jurisprudential thought as a response to the 
judicial activism of the liberal Warren Court); Lee Strang, The Most Faithful Originalist?: 
Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and the Future of Originalism, 88 U. DET.-MERCY L. REV. 873, 
881 (2011) (describing originalism as a “subversive movement” and acknowledging that 
“[o]riginalist arguments first appeared in modern form in the 1970s”). Robert Bork dates the 
movement away from originalism back to the Dred Scott decision. ROBERT BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 28–32 (1990) (crediting Dred 
Scott with inventing the concept of substantive due process). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss4/7
2019] ORIGINALISM AND SECOND-ORDER IPSE DIXIT 561 
 
the Framing.2 In his charming and candid defense of his own version of originalism, 
Justice Scalia acknowledged as much:  
It would be hard to count on the fingers of both hands and the toes of both 
feet, yea, even on the hairs of one’s youthful head, the opinions that have 
in fact been rendered not on the basis of what the Constitution originally 
meant, but on the basis of what the judges currently thought it desirable for 
it to mean.3 
Some early originalists claimed that constitutional adjudication before the New Deal 
was largely informed by originalist instincts.4 Critical literature quickly undermined 
that claim,5 and so-called New Originalists, writing since the 1990s, largely abandoned 
it.6  
Recently, in Senate testimony in support of the nomination of Neil Gorsuch to 
succeed Justice Scalia on the Supreme Court, originalist scholar Lawrence Solum 
observed: “For most of American history, originalism has been the predominate view 
of constitutional interpretation.”7 Increasingly, originalists have begun to echo 
Solum’s claim.8  
                                                          
 2  See Lorianne Updike Toler et al., Pre-“Originalism,” 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 277, 
287 (2012). 
 3  Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. Rev. 849, 852 (1989). 
 4  See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 373–79 (1977) (characterizing Justice John Marshall as a strict 
constructionist who attempted to give effect to the Framers’ original intent); BORK, supra note 
1, at 22–24 (arguing that Justice Marshall’s opinion Marbury v. Madison was motivated by a 
desire to preserve the Constitution’s original purposes); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF 
MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 
(1977) (contrasting the nineteenth-century tradition of judicial “interpretation” with judicial 
“legislation” beginning in the Lochner era).  
 5  See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 1, at 1220 (concluding that “originalist interpretation . . . 
constituted neither a predominant nor exclusive interpretive methodology” in early 
constitutional adjudication); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 906–07 (1985) (pointing out the Federalists’ view that the 
intentions of the drafters of the Constitution would not be legally relevant because they were 
“mere scriveners” appointed to draft an instrument for the people). 
 6  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (2006) (“The idea of originalism as an exclusive theory, as the criterion for measuring 
constitutional decisions, emerged only in the 1970s and 1980s.”); Randy E. Barnett, An 
Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 611–12 (1999) (dating the advent of 
originalism to the writings of Edwin Meese and Robert Bork); Keith E. Whittington, The New 
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004) (conceding that, for much of United 
States history, originalism “was not a terribly self-conscious theory of constitutional 
interpretation”). 
 7   Hearings on Nomination of the Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch to be an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, at 4 (Mar. 23, 2017) (statement of Lawrence B. 
Solum).  
 8   See, e.g., J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY 
AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 34 (2012) (claiming 
that Marshall “routinely displayed originalist tendencies”); Steven Calabresi, The Tradition of 
the Written Constitution, Text, Precedent, and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 646 (2006) 
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In this Article, I show that such claims are misleading in two ways. First, their 
authors define originalism too broadly, characterizing as originalist any opinion that, 
at some point, invokes the original meaning of the text or the original intent of the 
Framers. By this definition, almost anybody could be considered an originalist. Non-
originalists do not regard the Constitution as an inconvenient speed bump impeding 
the delivery of their partisan version of justice. In an uncharacteristic, non-combative 
moment, Justice Scalia conceded that most non-originalists are moderate and that little 
separates a moderate non-originalist from his own “faint-hearted” originalism.9 
Indeed, many scholars now stress the commonalities uniting originalist and non-
originalist approaches.10 Beginning with an attempt to discern the original meaning of 
the Constitution is a methodological commonality that unites originalists and non-
originalists.11 The fact that eighteenth-century opinions reference original meaning 
does not make them originalist any more than do similar references in contemporary 
opinions by Justices who think that the Constitution protects a fundamental right to 
privacy in the contexts of family planning and same-sex marriage.12  
                                                          
(characterizing Marshall’s opinions in Gibbons and McCulloch as an “attempt at a textual and 
originalist interpretation”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2725 (2003) (seeing originalist textualism as implicit in Marshall’s opinion 
in Marbury). John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport are a bit slippery on this issue. They begin 
their book with a quotation from James Madison in support of the claim that “Originalism . . . 
has been an important principle of constitutional interpretation since the early republic.” Their 
language (“an important principle”) suggests that it is but one of many, but they go on to 
associate that principle with the originalism of Justices Scalia and Thomas, for whom it is not 
merely one of many. JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE 
GOOD CONSTITUTION 1 (2013) [hereinafter MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE 
GOOD CONSTITUTION]. Indeed, a few pages later, they write of originalism’s “resurgence in the 
latter part of the twentieth century,” as if Justice Thomas’s originalism were the same as 
Madison’s originalism. Id. at 7. Later, they assert that the Marshall Court “largely articulated 
an original meaning approach.” Id. at 137 (citing WOLFE, supra note 4, at 41–63). They also 
accept Howard Gilman’s argument that “originalism was the standard mode of constitutional 
interpretation until the Progressive Era.” Id. at 138 (citing Gillman, The Collapse of 
Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the “Living Constitution” in the Course 
of American State-Building, 11 STUDIES IN AM. POL. DEV. 191, 205–09 (1997)). In an endnote, 
they state that originalism remained the “dominant philosophy of interpretation” into the early 
twentieth century. Id. at 259 n.36. 
 9   Scalia, supra note 3, at 862. 
 10  See, e.g., JACK BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION] (arguing that constitutional 
interpretation should aid in the realization of the Constitution’s overarching goal of a more 
perfect union); JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) (reconciling originalism and living 
constitutionalism through a “text and principle” approach); Colby & Smith, supra note 1 
(arguing that originalist methodology has adapted and changed in much the way that living 
constitutionalism describes).  
 11  Non-originalists supplement historical evidence with other interpretive tools, including: 
“history, tradition, precedent, purpose and consequence.” STEVEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 8 
(2005); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS 6 (2009) 
(advocating judicial restraint through adherence to precedent, process constraints, and 
internalized norms). 
 12  Some self-styled originalists have offered defenses of Supreme Court decisions that have 
traditionally been treated as the poster children of non-originalism. Jack Balkin provides an 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss4/7
2019] ORIGINALISM AND SECOND-ORDER IPSE DIXIT 563 
 
Second, these originalists rely on cherry-picked evidence and invocations of the 
Framers’ intentions as confirmations that the early Court was committed to a fully-
developed originalist methodology. As Randy Barnett, a leading New Originalist 
scholar, has pointed out, the early Court at times relied on “counterfactual hypothetical 
intentions of the [F]ramers.”13 Gestures towards the Framers’ intentions become the 
sleight of hand through which the Justices obscure other interpretive modalities, such 
as appeals to natural law or pragmatic considerations. Some early court decisions 
preface their ipse dixit (conclusory) judgments with invocations of original intent, thus 
masking subjective opinions with rhetorical appeals to authority.14 Often, when 
eighteenth-century judges reference original meaning or intention, they actually pay 
no mind to evidence of either, and generally they have no choice in the matter, because 
evidence of original meaning or intent was scant or anecdotal until the advent of 
originalist scholarship in the last third of the twentieth century.15  
In what follows, I show that the modern distinction between originalism and non-
originalism does not really capture the nature of constitutional adjudication in the 
Chisholm Court. Part II lays out four frameworks that inform the Article’s analysis of 
Chisholm: (1) the rather malleable concept of “originalism;” (2) non-hierarchical 
interpretive pluralism; (3) the eighteenth-century practice of issuing opinions seriatim; 
and (4) what I call second-order ipse dixit reasoning. Part III examines the opinions in 
Chisholm v. Georgia16 in detail. Chisholm was the most important constitutional case 
that the Court decided in the eighteenth-century, and it illuminates the early Court’s 
interpretive methodologies. In Chisholm’s multiple opinions, we see various 
                                                          
originalist defense of abortion rights. Jack Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 291 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Abortion]. Will Baude contends that originalist 
reasoning informed Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges. William 
Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2382 (2015) [hereinafter Baude, 
Is Originalism Our Law?]; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and 
Same-Sex Marriage, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 648 (2016) (concluding that state laws that prohibit 
same-sex marriage violate the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment). Most 
originalists do not think that the Constitution provides a basis for either abortion rights or same-
sex marriage. Originalist Justices Scalia and Thomas reject the idea that the Constitution as 
originally understood protects a right to privacy in the context of reproductive rights or a right 
to same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2632–37 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the Constitution as an originalist matter, provides no 
basis for the recognition of a right to same-sex marriage); id. at 2627–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(maintaining that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment could not provide a basis 
for prohibiting bans on same-sex marriages); Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., with Scalia, J., concurring) (reiterating the view that “the Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence . . . has no basis in the Constitution”). 
 13  See Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State?, Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular 
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1729, 1744 (2007) [hereinafter Barnett, The People or the State?] 
(naming Dred Scott and Hans v. Louisiana as examples of this rhetorical strategy). 
 14  See Toler et al., supra note 2, at 281 (“[T]hose who have studied anecdotal evidence have 
largely taken Justices’ claims at face value, without discovering whether the Justices’ claimed 
and practiced methodology align.”); id. at 325–26 (reiterating this conclusion). 
 15  See Clinton, supra note 1, at 1213 (finding it unsurprising that originalism did not 
predominate in early constitutional jurisprudence “in light of the general unavailability at that 
time of primary historical materials necessary to undertake originalist research”).  
 16  2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
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interpretive methodologies at work, side by side. The Justices barely acknowledge 
rival approaches and key judgments take place, as if it were, off-stage. The Justices 
frame the issue in Chisholm differently, based on second-order ipse dixit decisions, 
about what considerations are relevant to the resolution of the controversy. Part IV 
concludes with an assessment of the lasting importance of the precedents for judicial 
reasoning established during the Early Republic.  
II. FRAMEWORKS 
Before we delve into the interpretive techniques that inform the opinions of the 
Chisholm Court, this Part introduces four frameworks that I apply to the Court’s five 
opinions: (1) originalism, (2) non-hierarchical interpretive pluralism, (3) seriatim 
opinions, and (4) second-order ipse dixit opinions. While Section II.A ultimately 
concludes that originalism does not provide the best perspective through which to 
view the work of the early Court, the piece neither supports nor opposes originalism 
as an approach to contemporary problems of constitutional interpretation. Originalism 
can make, and has made, many contributions to our understanding of the Constitution, 
and such contributions retain their validity regardless of whether originalism helps 
describe the workings of the early Court. 
In Section II.B, I describe the early Court’s approach to constitutional 
adjudication, which was non-hierarchical interpretive pluralism. That is, the Court 
used many different interpretive modalities: textualism, intentionalism, purposivism 
(teleology), structuralism, and approaches informed by historical and legal precedent, 
pragmatism, logic, and common sense. The Justices established no hierarchy among 
these approaches, but made use of whatever interpretive modality seemed most 
appropriate to the occasion.17  
Pluralism was very much in evidence in the pre-Marshall Court, because, as 
discussed in Section II.C, the Justices presented their opinions seriatim. Early opinions 
featured no majority, concurring, or dissenting opinions.18 Each Justice wrote for and 
reasoned for himself.19 The Justices did not engage with or consider one another’s 
arguments.20 The separate opinions displayed different interpretive modalities, and 
each opinion could command equal dignity as a legal precedent. 
The Justices’ non-hierarchical, pluralist approach to interpretation, coupled with 
seriatim opinions, meant that second-order ipse dixit reasoning, discussed in Section 
II.D, bracketed the legal opinions of the early Court. Each Justice presented a legal 
opinion that was a world unto itself. Each Justice chose an interpretive framework that 
guided his legal reasoning. While the legal reasoning was, at times, brilliant, the 
Justices made no arguments for or against the frameworks within which they reasoned. 
Whatever might be the normative arguments for particular approaches to 
constitutional adjudication today, Justices of the early Court applied common-law 
techniques to constitutional adjudication. Their interpretive methodologies retain a 
kinship with but are not reducible to either modern-day originalism or living 
                                                          
 17  See generally id.  
 18  Ronald D. Rotunda, The Fall of Seriatim Opinions and the Rise of the Supreme Court, 
VERDICT (Oct. 9, 2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/10/09/fall-seriatim-opinions-rise-
supreme-court.  
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. 
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constitutionalism. Moreover, second-order ipse dixit decisions established the 
parameters within which legal interpretation occurred and set the stage for the Justices’ 
public interpretive acts, their legal opinions.  
A. Originalism and the Supreme Court in the Early Republic 
Today, the term “originalism” encompasses an extended family of methodological 
approaches.21 Some originalists welcome the term’s elasticity, but self-proclaimed 
originalists sometimes challenge others’ claims to belonging within the originalist 
fold.22  
In order to mitigate the vagueness of the term, I have adopted Larry Solum’s 
definition of originalism, comprising two components. First, the “fixation thesis” 
affirms that the meaning of each constitutional clause “is fixed at the time [it] is framed 
and ratified.”23 Second, the “constraint principle” stands for the view that the meaning 
                                                          
 21  One critic of originalism has identified seventy-two different theoretical strains within 
the originalist camp. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2009); 
see also Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 719–20 
(2011) (listing various strains within originalism, including original intent, original meaning, 
subjective and objective meaning, actual and hypothetical understanding, standards and general 
principles, differing levels of generality, original expected application, original principles, 
interpretation, construction, normative and semantic originalism); James E. Fleming, Jack 
Balkin’s Constitutional Text and Principle: The Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 669, 670 (2012) (arguing that originalists are united only in their rejection of moral 
readings of the Constitution). 
 22  This is most manifest in the responses to Jack Balkin’s originalism. See, e.g., Larry 
Alexander, The Method of Text and ?: Jack Balkin’s Originalism with No Regrets, 2012 ILL. L. 
REV. 611 (2012) (characterizing Balkin’s “text and principle” approach as yielding the same 
results as non-originalism); Fleming, supra note 22 (pointing out the similarities between 
Balkin’s approach and Dworkin’s “moral reading” of the Constitution and predicting that 
originalism might split into warring camps); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The 
Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 2012 ILL. L. REV. 737 (2012) (rejecting Balkin’s premise that 
constitutional provisions have an abstract meaning); Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: 
Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147 (2012) 
(expressing doubt as to whether Balkin’s progressive image of constitutional redemption can be 
reconciled with fidelity to the constitutional text). Similarly, Eric Segall, a prominent critic of 
originalism, claims that his work furthers the project of early originalists like Raoul Berger, 
Robert Bork and Lina Graglia, because he, like them, focuses on judicial restraint. Segall 
criticizes originalists who think activist judges can determine original meaning and overturn 
legislation enacted through democratic processes. See Eric J. Segall, Judicial Engagement, New 
Originalism, and the Fortieth Anniversary of “Government by the Judiciary,” FORDHAM L. 
REV. ONLINE (2017) (arguing that contemporary originalism departs from classic originalism 
and from early jurisprudential practice in calling for vacation of precedent absent evidence of 
clear error).  
 23  Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1935, 1941 (2013) [hereinafter Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution]. The 
implications of Jonathan Gienapp’s work on the fixation thesis have not yet emerged. Gienapp 
contends that the Framers did not think of the Constitution as fixing meaning in 1789, but that 
they came to do so over the course of the 1790s. JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: 
FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (2018). However, originalists who 
adhere to the fixation thesis can, consistent with Gienapp’s argument, do so based on fidelity to 
how the Framers came to think of the Constitution in the 1790s or based on normative theory 
untethered to the accidents of history.  
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of the constitutional text should constrain those who interpret, implement, and enforce 
constitutional doctrine.24 That is, originalists seek to find the original meaning and, 
having found it, treat it as dispositive of constitutional disputes.  
Solum’s definition leaves room for a great deal of variation among originalists.25 
However, if originalism is to have any bite26—if the concept is actually to help us to 
distinguish among modalities of constitutional adjudication—Solum’s two principles 
are key. Originalists can, and often do, disagree on how particular cases ought to be 
decided,27 and some originalists refuse to comment upon particular cases, reluctant to 
permit such details to interfere with the elaboration of their theoretical models.28 All 
judges begin with the constitutional text,29 but what distinguishes originalists from 
non-originalists is that originalists believe that, where original meaning is clear, there 
is no need for further judicial inquiry. 
Non-originalists tend to be far more skeptical about textual clarity and thus about 
the text’s ability to fix meaning. The Constitution does not, as Chief Justice Marshall 
put it, have “the prolixity of a legal code.”30 Instead, it features what Justice Brandeis 
called “majestic generalities,”31 such as “equal protection of law” and “cruel and 
unusual punishment,” to which the Framers may have expected later generations to 
assign content. As a result, non-originalists find that the constitutional text often does 
                                                          
 24  Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, supra note 23, at 1942.  
 25  James Fleming finds that this characteristic of originalism renders it a “family of 
theories” rather than a coherent approach to constitutional theory. James E. Fleming, The 
Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 433, 435 (2013).  
 26  See William Baude & Stephen Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, 20 GREENBAG 2D 103, 107–08 
(2016) (specifying that originalism’s bite requires following our original Constitution as 
lawfully changed, and listing Supreme Court opinions that likely do not meet this standard). 
 27  See D. A. Jeremy Telman, Originalism: A Thing Worth Doing . . ., 42 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 
529, 548 & nn.131–33 (2016) [hereinafter Telman, Originalism] (providing examples of basic 
questions that divide originalist scholars and of cases in which Justices Scalia and Thomas, both 
originalists, came to different conclusions or concurred with one another based on completely 
different reasoning). 
 28  See Baude & Sachs, supra note 26, at 108 (“In our theoretical work we’ve tried to avoid 
getting sucked into specific historical or doctrinal controversies, as that might detract from our 
arguments about theory.”). Larry Solum and Lee Strang are two additional examples of 
originalist scholars who, despite voluminous writings, rarely apply their theories to specific 
cases. 
 29  See, e.g., Berman, supra note 21, at 24–25 (averring that all non-originalists “explicitly 
assign original meaning or intentions a significant role in the interpretive enterprise”); Paul 
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 236 
(1980) (noting that even nonoriginalists accord “presumptive weight to the text and original 
history”); David A. Strauss, The Supreme Court, 2014 Term—Foreword: Does the Constitution 
Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (2015) (“It is never acceptable to announce that 
you are ignoring the text . . . .”). 
 30  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). 
 31  See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (writing with 
trepidation of the judge’s task of translating majestic generalities into concrete restraints on state 
officials). 
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not significantly bind judicial discretion.32 Even when the text is clear, non-originalists 
do not think that constitutional interpreters need be bound absolutely to original 
meaning.33  
It requires considerable work of translation to apply any version of contemporary 
originalism to the constitutional jurisprudence of the Early Republic. Because the 
Constitution was the first of its kind, there was no consensus about the interpretive 
method or methods appropriate to this unique document.34 The Justices nevertheless 
undertook constitutional interpretation without much discussion of the appropriate 
methodology for doing so.35 Faced with specific questions of constitutional 
interpretation on which the Framers themselves were sharply divided, the early 
Justices made interpretive choices that were not dictated by the Constitution itself and 
were constrained, but not determined by general interpretive canons.36 The Justices 
were not far enough removed from the time of the founding for there to be occasion 
to introduce the notion of a living constitution, but, as Jonathan Gienapp’s work 
indicates, the Framers did not subscribe to the notion that the Constitution could have 
a fixed meaning and purpose in 1789.37 That idea slowly took root during debates over 
the Constitution’s meaning in the 1790s.38 
As we shall see, in the Early Republic, constitutional adjudication often took place 
in what contemporary New Originalists call the “zone of construction”39 in which 
original meaning “runs out.”40  That is, when the early Supreme Court faced 
                                                          
 32  See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 29, at 59–60 (highlighting the difference between the 
Constitution’s “majestic generalities” and technical provisions and noting that the former are 
treated as statements of general principles and not as binding authority). 
 33  See Brest, supra note 29, at 237 (observing that nonoriginalists treat text and original 
history as presumptively binding and limiting but not as dispositive). 
 34  See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, Originalism All the Way Down?, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 159–
61 (2014) [hereinafter Lash, Originalism All the Way Down?] (rejecting the notion that 
interpretive methodologies appropriate to state constitutions could be applied to the federal 
Constitution and stressing ways in which the unique nature of the latter called for different 
interpretive approaches); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 519, 560–78 (2003) (discussing different interpretive traditions at the time of the 
Framing). 
 35  See generally Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 36  See Lash, Originalism All the Way Down?, supra note 34, at 154–65 (describing 
methodological heterodoxy in constitutional interpretation at the time of the drafting and 
ratification of the Constitution and during the Early Republic). 
 37  GIENAPP, supra note 23, at 1. 
 38  See id. at 1–19 (introducing his thesis that the conception of the Constitution as fixed 
was not inevitable and was developed in the course of debates among the Founders in the 
1790s). 
 39  See Keith Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 119, 123 (2010) (arguing that once interpretive tools are exhausted, constitutional 
decision-makers operate within a zone of construction, where they undertake “a particularly 
political task, a creative task involving normative choices in a realm of constitutional 
indeterminacies”). 
 40  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
65, 69 (2011) (acknowledging that the meaning of the Constitution sometimes runs out and that 
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constitutional issues, those issues had never been ruled on before (cases of “first 
impression”), and the constitutional text provided no clear solutions. In such 
circumstances, even today, the lines between originalism and non-originalism are 
fuzzy.41  
In the eighteenth-century, the meta-interpretive frame in which constitutional 
interpretation occurred was itself within the zone of construction. By “meta-
interpretive,” I mean that the Justices addressed subjects of interpretation that also 
provided the framework for resolving other interpretive issues.42 Meta-interpretive 
frames establish the parameters within which constitutional decision-makers can 
resolve particular interpretive issues.43 In Chisholm, for example, that subject was the 
question of sovereignty.44 Because the Framers disagreed about the theory of 
sovereignty informing the Constitution, originalism cannot resolve these meta-
interpretive issues. Constitutional decision-makers must resort to sources of authority 
other than the Constitution’s original meaning to resolve them. I have argued 
elsewhere that differences between originalists and non-originalists may amount to 
disagreements about how often original meaning runs out.45 In the eighteenth-century, 
because interpretation took place within a non-originalist meta-interpretive frame, 
original meaning ran out before interpretation began.46 
B. Non-Hierarchical Interpretive Pluralism 
The Constitution is a unique document. During the Framing and the Early Republic 
there were no fixed rules for the interpretation of a written constitution.47 Caleb Nelson 
elaborates: 
Did such a document trigger the rules of interpretation applicable to an 
ordinary statute? To a treaty? To a contract? Might different aspects of the 
Constitution implicate different sets of preexisting conventions, so that a 
hybrid approach was appropriate? Could special canons of construction, 
not applicable to any ordinary legal documents, be derived from the 
Constitution’s unique context and purpose? If so, what were those canons? 
                                                          
“[o]riginalism is not a theory of what to do when original meaning runs out”); Lawrence B. 
Solum, Semantic Originalism 19 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research, Paper Series No. 07-24, 2008), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id_1120244 (observing that when the meaning 
of the constitutional text is underdetermined, original meaning “runs out” and must be 
supplemented with constitutional construction). 
 41  See ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 98–99 (2018) (arguing that Solum’s two 
originalist principles play a very small role in the zone of construction and thus do not help 
judges decide hard constitutional questions). 
 42  D. A. Jeremy Telman, All That Is Liquidated Melts into Air: Five Meta-Interpretive 
Issues, 24 BARRY L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
 43  Id. 
 44  See infra, Part III.C. 
 45  Telman, Originalism, supra note 27, at 551. 
 46  See infra, Part III.C. 
 47  See Nelson, supra note 34, at 555. 
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The answers to these questions were far from clear, and members of the 
founding generation expressed a variety of different views.48 
For example, Nelson cites an 1820 case from a South Carolina court in which the judge 
lamented, “The Constitution of the United States . . . is so unlike those instruments for 
which the common law has provided rules of construction, that a Court must always 
feel itself embarrassed whenever called upon to expound any part in the smallest 
degree doubtful.”49 In his treatise on the Constitution, Joseph Story concluded that 
disagreements about the Constitution’s meaning resulted from “the want of some 
uniform rules of interpretation, expressly or tacitly agreed on by the disputants.”50  
Consistent with these later statements, eighteenth-century adjudication was 
pluralist and non-hierarchical. As a result, it is inconsistent with forms of 
contemporary originalism that privilege one interpretive modality (for example, 
textualism or intentionalism) over others.51 Constitutional adjudication in the 
eighteenth century is also inconsistent with John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport’s 
“original methods originalism,” to the extent that that approach excludes modalities 
that were common during the founding era.52  
                                                          
 48  Id. at 555–56. 
 49  Id. at 569 (citing M’Clarin v. Nesbit, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.), *519–20 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1820) (Huger)). 
 50  JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (1833) § 398, at 1:304. 
 51  Not all forms of originalism require a choice or a preference. McGinnis and Rappaport 
find intentionalism and textualism equally valid. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM 
AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 137 (finding substantial support for textualism 
and some support for intentionalism in the evidence of the interpretive approach of the Framers). 
 52  McGinnis and Rappaport argue that constitutional construction was not an original 
method. See John O. McGinnis & Michael R. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New 
Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. L. REV. 751, 773 (2009) 
[hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods] (“[A]dvocates of construction have not 
provided evidence that anyone embraced construction at the time of the Constitution's 
enactment, and we have been able to find none.”). However, William Baude and Stephen Sachs, 
who likewise offer a version of original methods originalism, think construction was an original 
method. See Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 12, at 2357–58 (acknowledging that 
originalists turn to construction or liquidation to resolve ambiguities or vagueness in the 
constitutional text); William Baude & Stephen Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 1079, 1128 (2017) (finding the distinction between interpretation and construction “both 
real and useful”).  
McGinnis and Rappaport also argue that living constitutionalism was not an original method. 
McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods, supra note 52, at 788–92. The claim is empirical, 
and I cannot address it fully in this space. Because McGinnis and Rappaport say they find no 
evidence of construction, only a few counterexamples are necessary to suggest that their review 
of original methods is either incomplete or conceptually flawed.  
While the example is not clear-cut, Joseph Story provides evidence that the Framers considered 
a change in circumstances as grounds for ignoring a statute’s commands. 
We find it laid down in some of our earliest authorities in the common law; 
and civilians are accustomed to a similar expression, cessante legis praemio, 
cessat et ipsa lex [the law itself ceases if the reason for the law ceases]. 
Probably it has a foundation in the exposition of every code of written law, 
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There have been several attempts at enumerating typologies of legal reasoning. 
John Hart Ely identifies six modes of non-originalist (“non-interpretivist” is his term) 
interpretation: (1) natural law, (2) a judge’s values, (3) neutral principles, (4) reason, 
(5) tradition, and (6) consensus.53  Philip Bobbitt’s typology is probably the most well-
known. He identifies six modalities of argument: (1) historical, (2) textual, (3) 
doctrinal, (4) prudential, (5) structural, and (6) ethical.54 Richard Fallon identifies five 
modalities: (1) text, (2) historical intent, (3) constitutional theory, (4) precedent, and 
(5) values.55 Both Bobbitt and Fallon note that it is often difficult to isolate and identify 
individual modes of argumentation, because judges tend to use interpretive modalities 
in combination, and each is used to reinforce the same result.56 Jack Balkin identifies 
eleven “topics” (topoi or modalities) of constitutional argument.57 His modalities 
differ from Bobbitt’s in that Balkin does not think that modalities are necessarily 
“incommensurable”; that is, Balkin believes modalities are tools that can be combined 
to aid in constitutional construction. He also contends that one can overcome 
arguments based on one modality with arguments drawn from another.58  
In my reading of the opinions of the early Court, I see Justices engaged in nine 
well-recognized interpretive modalities: (1) textualism, (2) intentionalism, (3) 
structuralism, (4) purposivism (teleology) and (5) appeals to precedent, (6) history, (7) 
morals, (8) logic, or (9) common sense, which may also entail pragmatic 
considerations. Like Bobbitt, I acknowledge that there may be additional modalities,59 
but these seem to me to be the main ones. The Justices freely deploy whichever 
interpretive modality strikes them as fitting for the case. They frequently combine 
                                                          
from the universal principle of interpretation, that the will and intention of 
the legislature is to be regarded and followed.  
STORY, supra note 50, § 459, at 1:350. The context makes clear that Story thinks the Latin 
maxim applies to the Constitution, which suggests an endorsement of something like living 
constitutionalism.  
 53  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 44–69 
(1980).  
 54  PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7–8 (1984) 
[hereinafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE].  
 55  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189–90 (1987). 
 56  See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 55, at 8 (“The various arguments 
illustrated often work in combination”); Fallon, supra note 56, at 1240 (“The implicit norms of 
our practice of constitutional interpretation prescribe an effort to achieve plausible 
understandings of arguments from text, the framers’ intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and 
relevant values, all of which point to the same result.”). 
 57  Jack Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 
659–61 (2013).  
 58  Jack Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution: The Topics in Constitutional Construction 
(forthcoming in CONST. COMMENT. (2018)) (manuscript at 209), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3133131 [hereinafter Balkin, Arguing about the Constitution].  
 59  See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 54, at 8 (acknowledging that his list 
might not be complete and that it could be supplemented). 
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interpretive modalities as all supporting the same outcome, but in seriatim opinions, 
it is easy to see that the modalities are often at odds. 
What happens when different modalities lead to different conclusions, as they 
often do? In such circumstances, second-order ipse dixit reasoning comes into play. 
For Bobbitt, this means that conflicts among different modalities must be resolved by 
recourse to individual moral sensibility or conscience,60 which are more likely to be 
stated than argued. Statements of moral sensibility or conscience constitute modes of 
second-order ipse dixit reasoning, but they are not the only ones. My typology differs 
from others in that it stresses the extent to which the judgments of the early Court 
turned on a tenth and largely unacknowledged modality: second-order ipse dixit 
reasoning. 
C. Second-Order Ipse Dixit Reasoning 
1. Cases of First Impression and Second-Order Ipse Dixit 
A pluralistic approach to interpretation permits judges to exercise, consciously or 
unconsciously, considerable discretion.61  Where different interpretive approaches can 
lead to different results, the judge may choose the approach that accords with her own 
sense of justice, practicality, or fairness to the parties to the dispute. To this day, even 
originalists have articulated no hierarchy of interpretive modalities that could cabin 
judicial discretion.62 
                                                          
 60  See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 168 (1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION] (contending that the Constitution relies “on the individual 
moral sensibility when the modalities of argument clash”). 
 61  See CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 34 (1996) (arguing that Marshall learned from his time as a Virginia practitioner “that 
judges in the ordinary course of deciding cases had broad discretion to determine what the law 
was, compelled as they were to choose from a variety of sources”).  
 62  John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport do not explain how their “original methods” 
originalism resolves issues when different interpretive modalities lead to contradictory results. 
See McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods, supra note 52, at 752 (introducing their 
conclusion that living constitutionalism and constitutional construction were not among the 
original methods but that ambiguity and vagueness could be resolved by considering evidence 
of history, structure, purpose, and intent). Will Baude recognizes a hierarchy with originalism 
at the top. See Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, supra note 12, at 2353. However, his is an 
inclusive originalism, embracing multiple interpretive modalities. See id. at 2355 (describing an 
“inclusive” originalism that recognizes “the validity of other methods of interpretation or 
decision”). Moreover, Baude concedes “a certain amount of [judicial] discretion both in 
articulating the rules and in deciding whether to apply them in a particular case.” Id. at 2360. 
Jack Balkin maintains that lawyers and judges who “embrace multiple interpretive theories” 
may “adopt a hierarchical ordering,” but he does not seem to think such a hierarchy is necessary, 
nor does he say what it is. Balkin, Arguing about the Constitution, supra note 58, manuscript at 
215. Richard Fallon offers a hierarchy, but also argues (persuasively) that, in practice, the 
hierarchy may be flipped: 
I shall argue, the implicit norms of our constitutional practice accord the foremost 
authority to arguments from text, followed, in descending order, by arguments 
concerning the framers’ intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and moral and policy 
values. But a caution is in order. For reasons to be explored later, the highest ranked 
categories are those in which any particular argument, in hard cases, is least likely to 
prove uniquely persuasive or determinate. Arguments from text and from the 
framers’ intent therefore possess less independent influence than their hierarchical 
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In the absence of an interpretive hierarchy or a coherent interpretive scheme, 
second-order ipse dixit reasoning can settle matters. Ultimately, judges deciding 
constitutional cases of first impression decide by deciding, when there is no other way 
to do so.  
Lacking either precedent or evidence of a clear consensus among the Framers, 
Justices of the early Court often had recourse to second-order ipse dixit decisions in 
constitutional adjudication. We think of ipse dixit judgments as devoid of all 
reasoning. Second-order ipse dixit judgments are not without justification, but they are 
decisions made at a crossroad where the arguments in favor of one path or another are 
equally valid. The judge decides simply by choosing one of two equally viable options. 
As we shall see in Part III, second-order ipse dixit judgments assert the correctness of 
the chosen path and ignore the alternative or waive it away with incredulity.  
Because case law now significantly hems in judges’ discretion, ipse 
dixit judgments are less common today. Still, they are not unheard of. Philip Bobbitt 
relates a story of a troubled Judge Henry Friendly who sought counsel from Judge 
Learned Hand on how to resolve a difficult case.63 According to Bobbitt, Learned 
Hand’s advice was, “Damn it, Henry, just decide it! That’s what you’re paid for.”64 
Bobbitt agrees. In difficult cases, Bobbitt acknowledges, interpretive modalities do 
not constrain the judge. “The case must be decided.”65 
2. Varieties of Ipse Dixit 
Judges never reveal their ipse dixit methods by announcing as the ground for their 
decision, “Because I say so.” Moreover, because judges want their reasoning sound in 
law, rather than in other normative realms, they are unlikely to volunteer the non-legal 
reasons that guide them into their legal analysis. Instead, judges disguise their ipse 
dixit reasoning as other things. Thus, ipse dixit reasoning can be hard to identify and 
can take many forms.  
In the early Court, appeals to the Framers frequently serve as both a prelude to and 
a disguise for ipse dixit pronouncements. There is, after all, a great difference between 
invocations of intentionalism and actual engagement in intentionalist methods of 
constitutional interpretation. Justices in the Early Republic would frequently state that 
they wanted to discern the intentions of the Framers, but they rarely made specific 
references to Framing-era texts.66 In most cases, when nineteenth-century Justices 
invoked the Framers or the Constitutional Convention or the ratification conventions, 
                                                          
status suggests. By contrast, although value arguments occupy the lowest rung in the 
hierarchy, they are likely to exert a very powerful influence on conclusions within 
other categories in a successful effort to reach coherence. 
Fallon, supra note 55, at 1193–94. 
 63  BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 60, at 166–67. 
 64  Id. at 167. 
 65  Id.  
 66  See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF 
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 231 (1995) (calling appeals to the Framers 
“a literary device”); Toler et al., supra note 2, at 308–09 (concluding that in its first hundred 
years, the Supreme Court specifically referenced individual Framers only twenty-one times, and 
most of those refer to influential people from the Framing era who did not actually participate 
in the Framing or to Framers who wrote in their personal capacity). 
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they would not specify a Framer, a part of the Constitutional Convention, or the 
ratification convention of a particular state.67 
Justices rarely referenced documents from the period beginning with the 
convening of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 through the ratification of the Bill 
of Rights in 1791.68 Early Justices drew on their own recollections of the founding 
events, but those recollections were by no means always in accord.  
The early Court’s failure to research the intentions of the Framers is unsurprising, 
given that the source materials that make originalism possible today were not available 
to eighteenth-century judges. George Washington held on to the official records of the 
debates from the Constitutional Convention.69 Washington eventually handed over 
those records, which are incomplete, to John Quincy Adams, who published them in 
1819.70 That version was edited and more widely circulated in 1830.71 James 
Madison’s influential account of the Constitutional Convention was first published in 
1840.72 Just after Madison’s account appeared, there was a brief increase in reliance 
on historical materials relating to the Constitution’s drafting and ratification,73 but its 
appearance did not transform constitutional jurisprudence. Late nineteenth-century 
constitutional adjudication looked a lot like late eighteenth-century constitutional 
adjudication in terms of its consultation of source materials relating to the 
Constitution’s drafting and ratification.74 
The first scholarly edition of the Constitutional Convention did not appear until 
1911.75 Powerful criticisms have been raised with respect to the accuracy of Madison’s 
                                                          
 67  Toler et al., supra note 2, at 310. 
 68  See id. at 304–05 (finding that less than 10% of citations to historical materials reference 
materials from the period of the Framing). Early on, Paul Brest noted that “if you consider the 
evolution of doctrines in just about any extensively-adjudicated area of constitutional 
law . . . explicit reliance on originalist sources has played a very small role compared to the 
elaboration of the Court’s own precedents.” Brest, supra note 29, at 234. 
 69  Mary Sarah Bilder, How Bad Were the Official Records of the Federal Convention?, 80 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1620, 1626 (2012) [hereinafter Bilder, How Bad?]. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. 
 72  JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Gordon Lloyd ed., 
2014). 
 73  See Clinton, supra note 1, at 1219 (“The publication of Madison’s notes in 1840 sparked 
a renewed interpretive interest in the treasure of historical material that his papers contained.”). 
 74  See Toler et al., supra note 2, at 302–17 (observing that reference to sources from the 
Framing period was extremely rare in the Court’s first 100 years, and most of those references 
came during the Marshall Court). 
 75  THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter Farrand]. 
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account76 and as to the official records of the Constitutional Convention.77 Such 
accounts are most relevant to intentionalists. Because most twenty-first-century 
originalists are more concerned with original public meaning than they are with 
original intent, the more important documents relate not to the drafting of the 
Constitution in Philadelphia but to its ratification in the several States.  
But there, the situation is no better. The first comprehensive scholarly account of 
the ratification was published in 2010.78  Even today, the documentary record relating 
to ratification is incomplete.79 We have detailed records of some ratification 
assemblies and almost none relating to others.80 Making sense of the ratification 
records is also a challenge, because the process took two years.81 Caleb Nelson 
contends that “conventions that ratified the Constitution early on (like Delaware and 
Pennsylvania) surely viewed the document differently in some respects than 
conventions that acted later (like Virginia and New York).”82 As a result, Nelson 
concludes, originalists seeking to enforce the ratifiers’ understanding of the 
Constitution “would have a menu of ideas to choose from.”83 
The record of deliberations relating to the Bill of Rights is also problematic. The 
first Congress discussed the Amendments, so we know something of the issues up for 
debate.84 However, the congressional debates leave many fundamental issues 
unresolved.85 Moreover, the final text was the product of a committee that kept no 
                                                          
 76  See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION (2015) (contending that Madison revised his account of the Convention in the 
years after the Convention to reflect his evolving views of the Constitution in action and of the 
men responsible for drafting it). 
 77  See Bilder, How Bad?, supra note 70, at 1623 (defending the usefulness of the official 
records and the competence of the recording secretary against Max Farrand’s assessment that 
the records are flawed and the secretary incompetent). 
 78  PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–88 
(2010); see id. at x (discussing previous scholarship on ratification, the best of which consisted 
of two edited collections that appeared in 1988 and 1989 but which devoted separate chapters 
to the ratification process in each state and thus missed part of the story). 
 79  See id. at xiii–xiv (describing the way Federalists conspired to create a one-sided record 
of the ratification debates that favored their perspective). 
 80  See id. at xii (noting that in the twenty-one-volume collection, The Documentary History 
of the Ratification of the Constitution, the records for Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia, and 
Connecticut take up one volume, while four volumes are devoted to Virginia and five to New 
York). 
 81  See Nelson, supra note 34, at 585. 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id. at 588; see also STORY, supra note 50, § 406, at 1:309 (observing that “there can be 
no certainty, either that the different State conventions in ratifying the Constitution gave the 
same uniform interpretation to its language, or that even in a single State convention the same 
reasoning prevailed with a majority, much less with the whole of the supporters of it”). 
 84  See generally CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE 
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).  
 85  See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten 
Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process 
of Law,” 77 MISS. L.J. 1, 155 (2007) (observing that the legislative history does not clarify 
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minutes of its proceedings and of a vote in the Senate, whose deliberations were secret 
by design.86 We know almost nothing of the state deliberations concerning adoption 
of the Bill of Rights.87 
A recent comprehensive review of the Supreme Court’s reliance on history and 
precedent found that, while the Court has generally espoused intentionalism, it has, 
throughout its history, strayed from intentionalist practice.88 The authors conclude that 
nineteenth-century constitutional adjudication was far more akin to common law 
adjudication, than it was to contemporary intentionalism.89 Surprisingly, they find that 
references to sources from the Constitution’s drafting history and ratification have 
become much more common in Supreme Court opinions written since 1980.90  
Justices in the Early Republic sometimes invoke the Framers’ intentions when they 
are actually just ascribing their own interpretation to the Framers.91 While the Supreme 
Court frequently invokes the intentions of the Framers in constitutional adjudication,92 
through the nineteenth century, the Court rarely sought after or ruled based on those 
intentions.93 All of this is consistent with the early originalists’ self-understanding of 
originalism as a self-conscious approach to constitutional interpretation dating from 
the last third of the twentieth century.94  
                                                          
whether “due process” was intended to incorporate common-law standards); Michael Anthony 
Lawrence, Second Amendment Incorporation Through the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges 
or Immunities and Due Process Clauses, 72 MO. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007) (noting that the legislative 
history does not clarify whether Congress intended for the Bill of Rights to apply to the states); 
H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 
1533 (1987) (calling the legislative history of the Bill of Rights “exceptionally unreliable”).  
 86  See RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
204 (2006) (noting that “little is known about the debate” in the Senate that winnowed the Bill 
of Rights down from seventeen amendments to twelve because “the Senate met behind closed 
doors until 1794, and thus the record of their discussion is sparse”).  
 87  See Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1424 (1991) (citing multiple authorities). 
 88  See Toler et al., supra note 2, at 283, 328 apps. 1–18 (2012) (recording references to 
historical sources in Supreme Court majority opinions, concurrences and dissents, including 
references to historical sources, precedent, secondary sources, and commentary on interpretive 
methodology). 
 89  Id. at 314. 
 90  Id. at 285. 
 91  See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Marbury, Marshall, and the Politics of Constitutional 
Judgment, 89 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1221 (2003) (noting that John Marshall derived “the Framers’ 
intent from his theory of constitutional purposes, not the other way around”). 
 92  See Toler et al., supra note 2, at 301 (finding that 60% of the Court’s statements regarding 
its own interpretive method in cases of constitutional first impression are best described as 
intentionalist). 
 93  See id. at 303 (concluding upon closer inspection that the Justices may have been doing 
something other than actually relying on the intention of the Constitution’s creators). 
 94  See id. at 287 & n.23 (dating the advent of the originalist movement in the 1980s and 
acknowledging that Justice Black’s originalist positions were generally stated in dissent). 
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As I illustrate in Part III with the Chisholm opinions of Justices Blair and Cushing, 
ipse dixit reasoning can look like textualism. A judge can provide a dispositive textual 
interpretation, while ignoring, or downplaying, the significance of a rival textual 
interpretation of similar plausibility. Moreover, teleological interpretations can exist 
in tension with textual readings, and judges freely avail themselves of both, thus 
enabling them to favor textual or teleological approaches based on ipse dixit hunches. 
Most commonly, evidence of ipse dixit reasoning must be looked for outside of the 
opinion in which it occurs. Seriatim opinions help us to see the roads not only not 
taken but bypassed without comment. The point here is to show the range of available 
approaches and the Court’s lack of consistency in its reliance or non-reliance on 
available approaches. 
3. Ipse Dixit as a Descriptive, Not a Normative, Term 
Second-order ipse dixit decisions are not arbitrary decisions. Judges are 
constrained through the usual mechanisms, including history, precedent, prudential 
considerations, logic, and common sense. In addition, they are disciplined by their 
courts’ cultures of collegiality. Because Supreme Court opinions are matters of public 
record, Justices take care to write opinions that will garner approbation from their 
colleagues on the bench, the legal profession, and the court-watching public.95  
More generally, Jack Balkin has argued persuasively that judges are bound by 
something akin to a fiduciary duty of good faith interpretation, which exerts its own 
constraining pull on judges.96 Balkin’s version of originalism requires fidelity to 
constitutional principles, but not to the Framers’ original expectations regarding how 
the constitutional text would be applied in specific situations.97 As he puts it: 
Constitutional interpretation by judges requires fidelity to the Constitution 
as law. Fidelity to the Constitution as law means fidelity to the words of the 
text, understood in terms of their original meaning, and to the principles 
that underlie the text. It follows from these premises that constitutional 
interpretation is not limited to those applications specifically intended or 
expected by the [F]ramers and adopters of the constitutional text.98 
Our common-law legal culture entails extensive judicial elaboration of the legal 
reasoning that leads to the holding. This tradition of discursive rationality constrains 
judges in ways that the political branches are not constrained. Legislation may be the 
product of horse-trading and back-room deals. Executive officers exercise 
considerable discretion and, absent scandal and investigation, need not explain their 
actions or inaction, or even their decision-making processes. Judges, by contrast, must 
justify their rulings and they do not want their reputations as apolitical and impartial 
                                                          
 95  On the influence of public opinion on the Court, see generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE 
WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED 
THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 96  See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 10, at 103–04 (arguing that 
fidelity to the text is the entire point of interpretation and arguing that judges and lawyers, 
regardless of whether they understand themselves as originalists, adhere to constitutional 
fidelity). 
 97  See Balkin, Abortion, supra note 12, at 295. 
 98  See id. 
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arbiters of legal disputes tainted by evidence of political partisanship, conflicts of 
interest, or reasoning to a pre-ordained result. Politicians, journalists, and judges 
empowered to challenge precedent will scorn and ridicule partisan or poorly reasoned 
judicial opinions.99 
I do not intend the phrase ipse dixit in a pejorative sense, nor do I think ipse dixit 
reasoning is inconsistent with Balkin’s idea of constitutional fidelity. Different 
modalities of constitutional interpretation might align. For example, the constitutional 
requirement that the President be at least thirty-five years old100 is uncontroversial 
because all interpretive modalities lead to the same conclusion as to the provision’s 
meaning.101 But, different modalities might also yield different results. A judge might 
be persuaded that the common understanding of the word “commerce” as used in the 
eighteenth-century connotes only “trade,” and not “manufacturing” or “navigation.”102  
However, the same judge might also conclude that the purpose of the Commerce 
Clause is to empower Congress to regulate the economy in ways that the states cannot 
or will not.103  The textual meaning and the purposive meaning are at odds, and the 
judge must choose between two plausible meanings of the constitutional text. When 
equally authoritative interpretive modalities are in conflict, they are incommensurable. 
A textual argument cannot defeat a structural argument, and a structural argument 
cannot defeat a textual argument.104 In the Early Republic, the Court often heard 
constitutional cases of first impression in which various interpretive modalities 
pointed towards different outcomes, and the Justices had to choose among equally 
plausible renderings of the Constitution’s meaning.105 The Justices took care to put up 
                                                          
 99  Id. at 335 & n.114. 
 100  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 101  See Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329, 342 (2013) (noting 
the “virtually unanimous agreement” that the Constitution “requires that the President of the 
United States be at least thirty-five years old” and that “[n]o reasonable interpretive gloss can 
disrupt sufficiently that plain meaning so as to alter the Article II rule”). 
 102  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce 
Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847, 856–62 (2003) (finding that the term “commerce” connoted only 
trade and exchange of goods when used in the Pennsylvania Gazette between 1728 and 1800); 
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 
(2001) (finding that the word “commerce” was used to mean only trade and exchange of goods 
in the records of the Constitutional Convention, the ratification debates, and the Federalist 
Papers); Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism 22–23 (unpublished 
manuscript) (forthcoming in U. PENN. L. REV (2018)), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3036206. 
 103  See Jack Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) (arguing that Congress’s 
Commerce Clause powers were part of a structural design “to give Congress power to legislate 
in all cases where states are separately incompetent or where the interests of the nation might 
be undermined by unilateral or conflicting state action”).  
 104  If the text is absolutely clear and cannot in any circumstances be reconciled with a 
purposive or structural argument, the text prevails. See STORY, supra note 50, § 401, at 1:306 
(observing that no recourse to alternative interpretive means is necessary where “the words are 
plain and clear”). However, that situation rarely, if ever, obtained in the constitutional 
adjudication of the Early Republic.  
 105  D. A. Jeremy Telman, John Marshall’s Constitution: Distinguishing Originalism from 
Ipse Dixit in Constitutional Adjudication 19 (Valparaiso Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies 
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signposts to highlight their engagement in traditional, acceptable interpretive 
modalities, but ultimately, they had to choose among equally authoritative but non-
reconcilable options. 
Ipse dixit reasoning is neither originalist nor living constitutionalist reasoning. 
Equally importantly, ipse dixit reasoning is not opposed to originalism or living-
constitutionalism. A recent example may help illustrate this point. In discussing a 
five–four decision of the Supreme Court in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,106 
Nelson Lund notes that the majority and the dissent agreed that the case could not be 
resolved based on the constitutional text, its legislative history, or the Court’s 
precedents.107 In Thornton, the Court invalidated an Arkansas law that required 
incumbent Senators to run as write-in candidates after two terms, as well as an 
incumbent Member of Congress’s ability to do so after three terms.108 Absent a firm 
footing in text, history or precedent, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, relied 
on “basic principles of our democratic system,”109 which he found articulated in a 
speech attributed to Alexander Hamilton.110 Justice Thomas, writing for the dissenters, 
relied on a different fundamental principle. For Justice Thomas, our federal 
government is one of limited and enumerated powers.111 Powers not granted to the 
federal government are reserved to the states.112  
Even though Justice Stevens’ and Justice Thomas’ inclinations lie on different 
sides of the originalism fault-line, that is not what separates them in this case. Rather, 
they each make decisions based on other principles and their judgments in the case 
follow from those principles, which are arrived at not by debating the principles, but 
by stating them.113 Originalists and non-originalists both engage in such second-order 
ipse dixit reasoning. During the Early Republic, when second-order ipse dixit 
reasoning predominated because so many constitutional issues could not be resolved 
by appeals to text or intention, the originalism/non-originalism divide does little 
explanatory work. 
                                                          
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 18-9, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3249726. 
 106  514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 107  Nelson Lund, Judicial Supremacy: Palladium of Liberty or Academic Paradox, 33 
CONST. COMMENT. 45, 45–46 (2018) (reviewing MARTIN REDISH, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (2017)). 
 108  Id. at 45. 
 109  Thornton, 514 U.S. at 806. 
 110  Lund, supra note 108, at 46. 
 111  Id. 
 112  Thornton, 514 U.S. at 847–48 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 113  See Lund, supra note 108, at 46 (“Rather than respond to Stevens with an alternative 
theory of democracy, Thomas relies on a legal principle that he thinks is implied by the 
Constitution’s enumeration of powers.”). 
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D. The Eighteenth-Century Tradition of Seriatim Opinions 
In the 1790s, Supreme Court Justices issued their opinions seriatim.114 Each Justice 
spoke for himself.115 They engaged the arguments of the attorneys, but they did not 
attack, or even acknowledge, one another’s reasoning. “For almost a thousand years, 
decisions of multimember courts in England were delivered orally by each judge 
seriatim and without any prior intracourt consultation.”116 David Currie contends that 
the practice of seriatim opinions made it difficult to know what the Court’s holding 
was in any given case,117 and the absence of an authoritative majority opinion 
weakened the Court as a political institution.118  
John Marshall ended the practice of seriatim opinions in a self-conscious effort to 
enhance the prestige of the Court, by having it speak with one voice.119 Marshall’s 
strategy of insisting on consensus paid off, elevating the Court, and Marshall, who 
signed most of the Court’s important opinions while he was Chief Justice.120 It also 
reduced or eliminated the cacophony produced by seriatim opinions, and thus clarified 
the law, while also making the legal process less transparent. 
As we shall see, in Chisholm, the Court’s tradition of issuing seriatim opinions 
made it possible for the Justices to engage in a variety of interpretive approaches 
without having to explain or justify their methodological decisions. In Chisholm, 
textual (Cushing and Blair), historical (Iredell, Jay, and Wilson), precedential (Iredell), 
and purposive (Jay and Wilson) approaches are on display. The Justices do not strive 
towards consensus either as to outcome or approach. They tacitly acknowledge the 
validity of diverse approaches and seem to welcome that diversity as a check against 
dogmatism or groupthink. 
III. SECOND-ORDER IPSE DIXIT IN CHISHOLM V. GEORGIA 
A. Ipse Dixit and Constitutional Fidelity 
For the most part, before the Marshall Court, Congress rather than the courts 
decided constitutional questions, as David Currie has detailed.121 However, Chisholm 
                                                          
 114  See Scott Douglas Gerber, Introduction: The Supreme Court Before John Marshall, in 
SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 1, 20 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 
1998) [hereinafter GERBER, SERIATIM]. 
 115  See id. 
 116  M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent, 
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 292 (2008).  
 117  DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED 
YEARS, 1789–1888, 44–45 (1985) [hereinafter CURRIE, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS]. 
 118  Id. at 55. 
 119  See GERBER, SERIATIM, supra note 115, at 20 (explaining the strategy behind Marshall’s 
abandonment of the tradition of seriatim opinions). Chief Justice Ellsworth tried to do away 
with the practice of seriatim opinions, but his efforts were only partially successful. See CASTO, 
supra note 66, at 110–11. 
 120  GERBER, SERIATIM, supra note 115, at 20. 
 121  DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801 
(1999); see CURRIE, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS supra note 118, at 4 (listing Chisholm as one 
of three “full-scale opinions construing the Constitution before the Marshall Court”). 
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provides an important exception.122 It also illustrates the extent to which constitutional 
interpretation in the Early Republic turned on second-order ipse dixit reasoning.  
The legal issue in Chisholm was whether federal courts could exercise jurisdiction 
over a suit brought against a state by a citizen of another state.123 Chisholm raised the 
important political and constitutional issue of state sovereignty.124 If states could be 
hailed into court by ordinary citizens, they were not sovereigns, but as the Georgia 
legislature put it, “tributary corporations to the government of the United States.”125 In 
addition, Chisholm had important economic implications. If Chisholm prevailed, 
states could be inundated with claims from loyalists or their heirs for debts that state 
laws had liquidated.126 States faced significant potential liability.127 Maryland, 
Virginia, New York, and Massachusetts all faced similar suits.128 
Chisholm arose out of events that took place in 1777; the claim was finally settled 
in 1847.129 In 1777, a merchant named Robert Farquhar sold nearly $170,000 of goods 
to the State of Georgia for the provisioning of American troops quartered near 
                                                          
 122  See Barnett, The People or the State?, supra note 13, at 1730 (calling Chisholm “the first 
great constitutional case decided by the Supreme Court”); Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm 
Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the Background Principle of Strict Construction, 50 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1577, 1691 (2009) [hereinafter Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail] (“Chisholm 
was the first great constitutional case issued by the Supreme Court. . . .”). 
 123  See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 466 (1793) (opinion of Cushing, J.) (“The 
grand and principal question in this case is, whether a State can, by the Federal Constitution, be 
sued by an individual citizen of another State?”). 
 124  Id. at 46–64. 
 125  Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1631, citing Proceedings of the 
Georgia House of Representatives, Dec. 14, 1792, reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–1800: SUITS AGAINST THE STATES 161 
(Maeva Marcus ed., 1994). [hereinafter 5 DHSC]. Others associated the exposure of states to 
suits by ordinary citizens with a reduction of their status from sovereigns to corporations. See, 
e.g., Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1585, citing JAMES SULLIVAN, 
OBSERVATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1791); id. at 
1622–23, citing Justice James Iredell, Observations on State Suability (1792). Iredell revisited 
this notion in Chisholm. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 447–48 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (contending that an 
action in assumpsit against a state would lie only if the state were considered a subordinate 
corporation, a position Iredell would “by no means admit”).  
 126  See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 447–48 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 127  Willis P. Whichard, James Iredell: Revolutionist, Constitutionalist, Jurist, in GERBER, 
SERIATIM, supra note 115, at 198, 211. 
 128  See Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1618–19 (discussing Straphorst 
v. Maryland, a contract dispute in which Dutch brothers sought to recover from the state of 
Maryland in federal court); id. at 1621–25 (discussing Oswald v. New York, in which the 
executor of a printer’s estate sued the state for recovery of unpaid services); id. at 1626–27 
(discussing Hollingsworth v. Virginia, in which the Indiana Company sued the State of Virginia 
over land claims in the western part of that state); id. at 1650–51 (discussing Vassal v. 
Massachusetts, the case that motivated Massachusetts to lead the movement to pass the Eleventh 
Amendment). 
 129  Doyle Mathis, Chisholm v. Georgia: Background and Settlement, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
112, 115 (1968). 
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Savannah.130 Farquhar was not paid.131 Farquhar died in 1784, and Chisholm, as 
executor of his estate, pursued Farquhar’s claim.132 After the Georgia legislature voted 
not to pay the claim in 1789, Chisholm brought his claim in federal court.133 Justice 
Iredell, sitting with Nathaniel Pendleton of the U.S. District Court for Georgia, heard 
the case as a U.S. Circuit Court judge.134 They dismissed the case for want of 
jurisdiction, and Chisholm appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.135 Despite repeated 
invitations from the Court, Georgia refused to appear to argue the case.136 
Four of the five Justices issued opinions in Chisholm’s favor.137 The reasoning of 
the Justices in the majority broke down along two lines. Two Justices relied primarily 
on the text of Article III, which provides for federal jurisdiction over  
“controversies . . . between a State and citizens of another State.”138 That provision 
exactly describes the situation at hand, and so, as a textual matter, it seems obviously 
to confer jurisdiction. However, two Justices in the majority focused less on the 
constitutional text than on the nature of sovereignty under the Constitution.139 For 
them, sovereignty resided in the people and in the federal government.140 States were 
not sovereign and thus could claim no sovereign immunity to suit.141  
Justice Iredell disagreed with the outcome.142 He regarded Article III as what we 
today call non-self-executing.143 That is, some constitutional provisions are self-
executing. They are binding law as soon as the Constitution goes into effect. No further 
action is required to make them enforceable law, although in cases such as Mapp v. 
                                                          
 130  Id. at 115. 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id.  
 133  Id. at 115. 
 134  Id. at 116.  
 135  Id.  
 136  Id. The Court went so far as to invite any member of the bar in attendance to speak in 
opposition to Chisholm’s suit, but none volunteered. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra 
note 123, at 1631. 
 137  See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 466 (1793). 
 138  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 139  See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 466. 
 140  Id. 
 141  Id. 
 142  Id. at 449–50. 
 143  John Marshall first introduced the idea that some constitutional provisions are not self-
executing. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (holding that treaties are not 
immediately operative as domestic law when they, by their terms, call for some additional 
legislative act), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 89 (1833). 
The term “self-executing” first appeared in Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) 
(noting that stipulations that are not self-executing require legislation).  
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Ohio, a court may have to use its common-law powers to fashion a remedy.144 For 
example, the President became Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (once 
called into service)145 as soon as the Constitution was ratified. Congress did not need 
to pass a statute giving him such powers, because the Commander-in-Chief Clause is 
regarded as self-executing. By way of contrast, the Supreme Court has held that, 
notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause,146 which renders treaties “supreme law,” 
treaties do not automatically create binding domestic law.147 Non-self-executing 
treaties require congressional implementation before they can have effect as part of 
our domestic legal system.148  
In Justice Iredell’s view, the Constitution set the outer bounds of the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction, but the courts could not exercise the full scope of that jurisdiction without 
congressional authorization, which was wanting in Chisholm.149 The outcome of the 
case turned on second-order ipse dixit determinations about the nature of the legal 
issue and the interpretive methods to be deployed. Four Justices combined textual 
approaches with historical and purposivist approaches, and allowed for the exercise of 
federal jurisdiction.150 Justice Iredell combined a structural approach to the 
Constitution with a historical inquiry into the exercise of jurisdiction in cases against 
states.151 All Justices were attempting to construe the Constitution, but they arrived at 
different conclusions as to the meaning of that document because their opinions 
stemmed from ipse dixit determinations not defended in the text of their opinions. 
The Justices do not express disagreement with one another or even engage one 
another’s arguments.152 Each speaks for himself, and each opinion turns, at crucial 
junctures, on ipse dixit reasoning.153 Far from deferring to the intentions of the 
Framers, all of the Justices, including Justice Iredell, reject (again without 
acknowledgement or discussion) Alexander Hamilton’s assurances in Federalist No. 
                                                          
 144  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (creating the exclusionary rule as a remedy for 
violations of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unlawful searches and seizures). 
 145  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be commander in chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into 
the actual service of the United States.”). 
 146  See U.S. CONST. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which 
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land . . . .”). 
 147  See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 519 (2008) (citing nineteenth-century authorities 
for the proposition that treaties are non-self-executing and do not have effect as domestic law 
when “they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect”).  
 148  See id. at 504–05. 
 149  See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 433 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 150  See id. at 419. 
 151  See id. at 433 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 152  See generally id.  
 153  Id. 
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81154 and similar statements by others during the ratification process that the states 
would retain their sovereign immunity under the new Constitution.155 At the same 
time, each Justice strives to give effect to the Constitution as he understands it. 
B. The Justices as Framers 
In Justice Iredell’s dissenting opinion, which is now regarded as vindicated with 
the passage of the Eleventh Amendment,156 he states that he is giving effect to the 
Framers’ intentions.157 He alone of the five Justices who heard the case would have 
held that federal courts have no jurisdiction over a suit between a state and a citizen 
of another state.158 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Iredell rejected two possible 
interpretations offered by Attorney General Edmund Randolph, who served as counsel 
for Chisholm.159 Justice Iredell certainly had no greater claim than Randolph to 
insights into what the Framers of Article III intended. Unlike some of his colleagues 
on the Chisolm Court, Justice Iredell did not attend the Constitutional Convention,160 
apparently for want of means rather than want of interest.161 Randolph was not only 
there; he introduced the Virginia Plan.162 Although he refused to sign the document at 
the end of the Constitutional Convention, Randolph changed his mind163 and, as chair 
                                                          
 154  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(arguing that states retain their sovereignty under the Constitution and that sovereign entities 
are not amenable to suit without their consent). 
 155  See JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER: A SOURCE BOOK OF EARLY AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION HISTORY 70 (1991) [hereinafter POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER] (noting that the 
Chisholm opinion “upset expectations created by ratification assurances . . . that the states 
would retain their sovereign immunity”); Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 
1599–1603 (citing examples from the ratification debates suggesting that Federalists, including 
Madison, Marshall, Hamilton, and Rufus King, conceded that the powers of the federal courts 
should be strictly (or narrowly) construed so as to preserve state sovereignty). 
 156  But see John V. Orth, Truth About Justice Iredell’s Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia 
(1793), 73 N.C. L. REV. 255, 263 (1994) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment went well 
beyond Justice Iredell’s opinion, which limited itself to the subject of assumpsit). 
 157  See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 433 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“The Constitution intended this 
article . . . to be the subject of a Legislative act.”). 
 158  See id. at 449 (concluding that Article III must be implemented through legislation and 
that such legislation is wanting with respect to suits between a state and a citizen of another 
state). 
 159  See id. at 430 (“[A]fter the fullest consideration, I have been able to bestow on the 
subject, and the most respectful attention to the able argument of the Attorney-General, I am 
now decidedly of the opinion that no such action as this before the Court can legally be 
maintained.”). 
 160  CASTO, supra note 66, at 62.  
 161  See Whichard, supra note 128, at 198, 206–07 (ascribing Iredell’s absence from the 
Convention to his “cursed poverty” but noting his influence on the North Carolina delegation 
through correspondence). 
 162  Farrand, supra note 75, at 20–22. 
 163  MAIER, supra note 78, at 261 (describing Randolph as having “made his peace” with 
ratification as “the anchor of our political salvation, with amendments to follow under Article 
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of the Virginia Ratification Convention, where some of the most storied debates took 
place,164 became one of the Constitution’s greatest advocates.165 Iredell, meanwhile, 
was a “star speaker” at North Carolina’s Hillsborough Convention,166 which voted not 
to ratify the Constitution without amendments.167 North Carolina ratified the 
Constitution in November 1789 after the new Constitution had already gone into 
effect.168  
In his Chisholm opinion, Justice Iredell refers to the intentions of the Framers, but 
he cites to no evidence of such intention. Rather, he cites to the text and to practice 
and custom.169 Significantly, he rejects without discussion Randolph’s proffered 
arguments, drawing on the Law of Nations170 and policy considerations.171 Justice 
Iredell’s position was not that such considerations are per se inadmissible to decide a 
constitutional case; rather, Justice Iredell saw no need to consult either when the 
constitutional case was, in his view, clear.172   
The other Justices, who agreed with Randolph’s view that the exercise of 
jurisdiction was proper, included John Jay, one of the authors of The Federalist 
Papers, and James Wilson, a member of the Constitutional Convention’s Committee 
of Detail,173 as well as a leader of Pennsylvania’s ratifying convention.174 Many 
scholars consider Wilson “as crucial a member of the Constitutional Convention as 
any other, including James Madison.”175 Justice William Cushing served as Vice 
                                                          
V”). 
 164  Id. at 257 (observing that Patrick Henry forced the Virginia Convention to “confront big 
questions . . . that had not been explored, certainly not with equal rhetorical flare, in any 
previous ratifying convention”).  
 165  Id. at 260 (describing Randolph as the “obvious person” to answer Patrick Henry’s 
criticisms of the Constitution); id. at 320 (quoting contemporary commentary that Randolph 
“amazed everyone” with his enthusiastic support for ratification). 
 166  Id. at 406; see also id. at 411 (describing Iredell as having taken the lead in defending 
the Constitution at the Hillsborough Convention). 
 167  Id. at 421. 
 168  Id. at 457. 
 169  See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 433 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 170  See id. at 449 (remarking that he had had no “occasion to notice many arguments offered 
by the Attorney General relating to the Law of Nations”).  
 171  See id. at 450 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (noting that a court should entertain policy 
considerations only if the case is “very doubtful” and that in this case his own view of policy 
diverged from that of the Attorney General).  
 172  See id. at 449 (finding no need to discuss the Law of Nations where domestic law clearly 
provided no basis for jurisdiction).  
 173  William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 202 (2012). 
 174  MAIER, supra note 78, at 103–15 (describing Wilson’s role as the only member of the 
federal convention present and as the chief expounder and defender of the Constitution at the 
Pennsylvania convention). 
 175  Barnett, The People or the State?, supra note 133, at 1733; see also Mark D. Hall, James 
Wilson: Democratic Theorist and Supreme Court Justice, in SERIATIM, supra note 115, at 126, 
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President of the Massachusetts ratifying convention.176 John Blair represented Virginia 
in the Constitutional Convention177 and was a quiet defender of a strong national 
government at the Virginia ratifying convention.178 Prior to that, he had been an 
important legislator179 and jurist in Virginia180 before being among the first men whom 
George Washington nominated to the Supreme Court.181 If the point of the exercise 
was to determine the intentions of the Framers, Justice Iredell could have surveyed the 
Framers assembled around him. Iredell arrived at his conclusions by other means, not 
even citing evidence of the Framers’ intentions that supported his position.182 
C. The Opinions 
Taking the opinions of Chisholm together, we see the Justices engaging in 
numerous modes of constitutional interpretation, but each opinion turns on its author’s 
idiosyncratic reasoning. Justice Iredell’s opinion turns on his view that the 
Constitution’s Article III is not self-executing.183 Justice Blair assumes the opposite, 
and thus, concludes that the text of Article III as written gives rise to federal 
jurisdiction without the need for statutory authorization.184 Justice Cushing’s approach 
is very similar. He rejects Justice Iredell’s position without mentioning it and without 
engaging with Iredell’s arguments.185 Justice Wilson focuses on the nature of 
sovereignty, and his opinion turns on his view that sovereignty rests with the people 
or with the union but not with the states.186 Chief Justice Jay’s opinion similarly 
focuses on the nature of sovereignty.187 Regarding sovereignty as residing with the 
people, he rejects Georgia’s claim that sovereign immunity deprives the federal courts 
of jurisdiction over a suit against a state by a citizen of another state.188  
                                                          
129 (citing seven prominent scholars of the Founding era who rank Wilson just behind Madison 
as the most important figures at the Constitutional Convention). 
 176  See MAIER, supra note 78, at 193 (describing Cushing as vice president of the convention 
and a leading federalist). 
 177  See Wythe Holt, John Blair: “A Safe and Conscientious Judge,” in SERIATIM, supra note 
115, at 162 (noting that, according to Madison’s records, Blair never spoke at the Convention). 
 178  See CASTO, supra note 66, at 59. According to James Monroe, Blair said nothing but 
favored the adoption of the Constitution. Holt, supra note 179, at 162. 
 179  See Holt, supra note 178 at 157–58. 
 180  See id. at 158–61. 
 181  Id. at 162. 
 182  See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 432 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“The 
framers of the Constitution, I presume, must have meant one of two things”). 
 183  See id. at 432–33. 
 184  See id. at 451 (opinion of Blair, J.). 
 185  See id. at 467 (opinion of Cushing, J.). 
 186  See id. at 454, 455, 458 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
 187  See id. at 469–70 (opinion of Jay, J.). 
 188  See id. at 479. 
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1. Justice Iredell and Assumpsit Claims Against the Sovereign 
Justice Iredell had written on the question of whether states could be sued prior to 
Chisholm.189 The issue arose in an earlier case, Oswald v. New York.190 It seems that 
Iredell prepared an opinion for that case, which was dismissed on other grounds.191 
Iredell’s draft opinion became his draft essay, Observations on State Suability, which 
he worked on in February 1792, but never finalized,192 some of which found its way 
into his Chisholm opinion.193 His opinion turns on two bits of second-order ipse dixit 
reasoning. First, he decides that states are sovereign.194 Second, he takes Article III of 
the Constitution to be non-self-executing.195 
Justice Iredell begins his analysis with a historical methodology, which remains 
his primary mode of interpretation. Under English common law, Justice Iredell notes 
at the outset, a court would have no jurisdiction over a case such as Chisholm’s, 
sounding in assumpsit, against a sovereign.196 Justice Iredell next turns to the text of 
the Constitution and notes that Section 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act follows the 
Constitution and grants the Supreme Court non-exclusive jurisdiction over “civil 
controversies” between a state and a citizen of another state.197  
Justice Iredell then entertains two possibilities for the meaning of the word 
“controversies” in this context. First, Article III may have intended to convey “that 
part of the Judicial power” not allocated to the other branches, but that reading would 
entail an assumption that the “Judicial power” entails authority only relating to matters 
over which common-law courts could exercise jurisdiction in the eighteenth 
century.198 Second, Article III may be understood to empower Congress to create 
federal jurisdiction with respect to the cases or controversies enumerated in Article 
III.199 Such congressional action would be necessary where there was no common-law 
basis for the exercise of such jurisdiction.200 In other words, with respect to the 
enumerated cases and controversies, Article III either granted the federal courts such 
                                                          
 189  See Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1622.  
 190  See id. 
 191  See id. at 1622–23. 
 192  James Iredell, Observations on State Suability, (Feb. 11–14, 1792), reprinted in 5 DHSC, 
supra note 125, at 76–88. 
 193  See Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1622–23. 
 194  See Iredell, supra note 193, at 82. 
 195  See Scott Douglas Gerber, Deconstructing William Cushing, in SERIATIM, supra note 
115, at 108. 
 196  See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 430 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (noting 
that, as the Attorney General surely knows, an action against the Crown in assumpsit will not 
lie). 
 197  See id. at 431 (summarizing the Judiciary Act). 
 198  See id. at 432 (referring to “antecedent laws for the construction of the general words” 
used). 
 199  See id. 
 200 See id. (allowing that Congress might be empowered to grant courts jurisdiction “at least 
in cases where prior laws were deficient for such purposes . . . .”). 
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jurisdiction as already existed under common law, or it granted that jurisdiction, plus 
whatever additional jurisdiction Congress created pursuant to its Necessary and Proper 
Clause powers.201 
However, Attorney General Randolph offered a third possibility, which was, 
Justice Iredell noted, “a construction, I confess, that I never heard of before, nor can I 
now consider it grounded on any solid foundation[.]”202 That construction was that the 
Constitution conveys to the judiciary the powers vested therein, without reference to 
the eighteenth-century common-law background and without the need for further 
action by the legislature.203 But in refuting Randolph’s view of the scope of federal 
judicial power, Justice Iredell appealed not to the constitutional text nor to the 
Framers’ intent but to his own conception of the judiciary: 
My conception of the Constitution is entirely different. I conceive, that all 
the Courts of the United States must receive, not merely their organization 
as to the number of Judges of which they are to consist; but all their 
authority, as to the manner of their proceeding, from the Legislature only.204 
In Justice Iredell’s view, the jurisdictional grants in Article III were non-self-
executing. The federal courts could exercise jurisdiction only over cases over which 
they would have had jurisdiction at common law or over cases that Congress, through 
legislation, granted them. This reading of Article III grounds the legal reasoning that 
follows. 
Having rejected the Attorney General’s contention that the Constitution 
automatically grants federal courts jurisdiction over all categories of cases enumerated 
in Article III, Justice Iredell dutifully searches for a basis in positive law for the federal 
courts’ exercise of jurisdiction in this case. Such jurisdiction could come from only 
two sources, legislative act or common law.205 He entertains the possibility that state 
law could give rise to such an action, but he quickly concludes that Georgia law does 
not do so, nor do the laws of any other state.206 
Justice Iredell turns back to the Judiciary Act, Section 14, which establishes the 
courts’ powers to issue writs “which may be necessary for the exercise of their 
respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.”207  He 
seizes on the reference to “usages” to argue that the Act intended to limit the courts’ 
exercise of jurisdiction to those controversies over which they had traditionally had 
jurisdiction under English common law.208 Justice Iredell then undertakes an 
                                                          
 201  See id. at 432 (referencing Congress’s Necessary and Proper Clause powers as the legal 
basis for such action). 
 202  Id. 
 203  See id. 
 204  Id. 
 205  See id. at 434. 
 206  See id. at 434–35. 
 207  Id. at 433–34. 
 208  See id. at 434. 
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exhaustive review of existing case law and concludes that no action at law existed 
against the sovereign; the only remedy was a petition of right.209  
The remainder of the opinion looks like textualism informed by history and 
precedent. However, the diversion into history is made possible through a crucial turn 
at an ipse dixit crossroad.210 In Justice Iredell’s view, states are either just as sovereign 
as the English King, or they are mere corporations subordinate to the federal 
government.211 Facing this stark choice, Iredell could only treat states as sovereign, 
stating: “The United States are sovereign as to all the powers of Government actually 
surrendered: Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all the power reserved.”212 The 
notion that the Justices had to choose between treating states as sovereign and treating 
them as corporations illustrates the nature of ipse dixit reasoning; no other Justice 
expressed the view that states, not being sovereign, were mere corporations 
subordinate to the federal government.213 Justice Iredell could not accept a world in 
which states retain aspects of their sovereignty and yet surrender their sovereign 
immunity to suit by ordinary citizens.214 
Justice Iredell’s reasoning is as follows: (1) there must be a legislative enactment 
giving the courts jurisdiction over an action in assumpsit against a state; (2) the 
legislature has authorized no such action, and custom and usages recognize no such 
action; therefore, (3) the courts are without jurisdiction.215 All of this follows logically 
from Justice Iredell’s principles, but his legal conclusion can persuade only those who 
agree with his views that states are sovereign and that Article III is not self-executing. 
Justice Iredell ultimately falls back on his own sense of what is fitting and proper 
in constitutional arrangements. Such ipse dixit reasoning is inevitable, even within 
originalist interpretive modalities, as originalist interpretation can point towards many 
different solutions. Ultimately, the judge has to choose the conclusion that seems right, 
even though the alternatives are plausible. Justice Iredell’s logic is sound, but it 
assumes that states are sovereign and that Article III is non-self-executing, and those 
propositions cannot be proven or disproven based on appeal to original meaning or 
                                                          
 209  See id. at 437–46. 
 210  I am not the first to characterize Iredell’s opinion as ipse dixit. See CASTO, supra note 66, 
at 190 (calling Iredell’s opinion “superficially comprehensive” and accusing Iredell of engaging 
in “virtual ipse dixit” and question begging). 
 211  See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 435, 447 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 212  Id. at 435; see also id. at 447–49 (rejecting the notion that states are corporations 
subordinate to the federal government). 
 213  Attorney General Randolph addressed the argument only to dismiss it as irrelevant to the 
case. Id. at 429 (argument of Att’y Gen. Randolph) (“I banish the comparison of States with 
corporations; and, therefore, search for no resemblance in them.”). Justice Cushing finds that 
the question is not whether states are corporations but “what are their powers?” Id. at 468 
(opinion of Cushing, J.). Justice Wilson says something similar, at much greater length, as is 
his wont. He notes that a state is an “artificial person” and goes on to characterize the range of 
attributes that such an artificial person might have. Id. at 455 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
 214  Compare id. at 435 (opinion of Iredell, J.), with id. at 447. 
 215  See id. at 449. 
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intention.216 As is clear from the differing views of the Justices in Chisholm, the 
Framers left the issue unaddressed and made different and irreconcilable assumptions 
as to its resolution.  
In his conclusion, Justice Iredell frankly states that he sees no need to address the 
majority of Attorney General Randolph’s arguments on behalf of Chisholm.217 “I have 
not had occasion to notice many arguments offered by the Attorney General, which 
certainly were very proper, as to his extended view of the case, but do not affect 
mine.”218 So it is when opinions are informed by different ipse dixit perspectives. 
2. Justice Blair’s “Unimaginative”219 Textualism 
Justice Blair, in his short opinion in Chisholm, announces, “The Constitution of 
the United States is the only fountain from which I shall draw; the only authority to 
which I shall appeal,”220 thus saving himself the trouble of addressing the arguments 
of his brethren, Jay, Wilson, and Iredell. In short order, he reads the constitutional text 
as clearly conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear a controversy between 
a state and a citizen of another state.221 The only question for him was whether a state 
could be a defendant in such a case.222 Reviewing other areas of the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction, Justice Blair quickly concludes that the Constitution is best understood as 
granting the federal courts jurisdiction regardless of the state’s status as plaintiff or 
defendant.223 After all, federal courts have jurisdiction over cases involving two 
states,224 and in such a case, one of the states must be the defendant.225 Moreover, 
federal courts have jurisdiction over controversies “between a state . . . and foreign 
states.”226 It is unlikely that a foreign state would be a defendant in a United States 
court, so it seems that the last-named party could be a plaintiff as well as a defendant.227  
Justice Blair’s breezy conclusion that Article III eliminates the states’ sovereign 
immunity to suit by a citizen of another state also ignores significant evidence that the 
                                                          
 216  But see Scott Douglass Gerber, Deconstructing William Cushing, in  SERIATIM, supra 
note 114, at 108 [hereinafter Gerber, Deconstructing William Cushing] (accusing Iredell of 
ignoring “the plain words of the Constitution”). 
 217  See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 449 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 218  Id. 
 219  CASTO, supra note 66, at 192. But see Gerber, Deconstructing William Cushing, supra 
note 219, at 109 (defending Blair’s and Cushing’s textualism). 
 220  Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 450 (opinion of Blair, J.). 
 221  See id. at 450 (opinion of Blair, J.) (finding that this case “undoubtedly” comes within 
the scope of cases over which Article III grants federal courts jurisdiction, unless the purpose 
of the language is to permit only cases initiated by a state). 
 222  See id. at 450–51 (opinion of Blair, J.). 
 223  See id. at 451. 
 224  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (giving federal courts jurisdiction over “controversies 
between two or more states”). 
 225  See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 451 (opinion of Blair, J.). 
 226  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 227  See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 451 (opinion of Blair, J.). 
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Framers had a contrary intention. John Marshall, responding to anti-Federalists in the 
Virginia Ratification Convention, insisted that Article III would not grant federal 
courts jurisdiction over states as defendants for the obvious reason, “It is not rational 
to suppose, that the sovereign power should be dragged before a Court.”228  James 
Sullivan, the Massachusetts Attorney General and an early voice in support of the 
Eleventh Amendment, also thought Article III best construed as granting federal 
courts jurisdiction only when the state was a plaintiff in a suit against a citizen of 
another state.229 Given that the issue in Chisholm had already been raised in other 
federal cases, Blair likely knew that even many staunch federalists read Article III 
differently. He did not feel the need to address their arguments, and indeed what could 
he do other than point to the text?  
Justice Blair does consider the practical question of enforcement of judgments 
against states but finds the issue easily resolved. If a state were to resist the 
enforcement of a federal court judgment against it, the same action could then be 
brought in state court, and Justice Blair imagines that the federal judgment would be 
treated as res judicata.230 It is in this context that he briefly addresses Justice Iredell’s 
arguments about the common-law tradition that courts did not entertain actions in 
assumpsit against sovereign states. He sees “no reason for confining the Plaintiff to 
proceed by way of petition,” and he notes that doing so might even be an 
“impropriety.”231 By adopting the Constitution, Georgia forfeited that aspect of its 
sovereignty.232 His reasoning seems purely textualist, but, by not looking beyond the 
text, Justice Blair also engages in ipse dixit reasoning, deeming Article III self-
executing without inquiry. 
3. Justice Wilson on Sovereignty Under General Principles of Right 
Justice Wilson’s opinion is a short treatise in political theory. As Randy Barnett 
has noted, Justice Wilson relies primarily on “‘general theories of right’ and only 
secondarily on the constitutional text.”233 Although Wilson had a pecuniary interest in 
the outcome of the case,234 his reasoning in Chisholm is consistent with his views 
expressed in other contexts.235  
                                                          
 228  See Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1601 (quoting remarks of John 
Marshall in the Virginia Convention, June 20, 1788). 
 229  See Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1619 (citing JAMES SULLIVAN, 
OBSERVATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1791)). 
 230  See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 452 (opinion of Blair, J.) (“Might [plaintiff] not rely upon the 
judgment given by this Court in bar of the new suit? To me it seems clear that he might.”). 
 231  Id.  
 232  See id.  
 233  Barnett, The People or the State?, supra note 13, at 1731. 
 234  See CASTO, supra note 66, at 195 (recounting Wilson’s interest in the Indiana Company 
that was a party to a case raising the same issue in Hollingsworth v. Virginia). 
 235  See id. Although Kurt Lash regards Justice Wilson and Chief Justice Jay as having had 
“significant conflicts of interest” in Chisholm (Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 
123, at 1694), Casto points out that eighteenth-century judges saw no need to recuse themselves 
when they had an interest in the outcome of a case, as they had sworn an oath to do justice in 
any case. CASTO, supra note 66, at 195 (citing Blackstone). 
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His method of constitutional exposition in the initial section has little to do with 
textual interpretation. His only source material is the logic of what he calls “principles 
of general jurisprudence.”236 He proceeds by Socratic method, posing questions and 
immediately answering them and dismissing all possible objections.237 He begins with 
a discussion of the nature of states as aggregates of persons.238 States, he says, as 
“artificial persons,” can do many of the things that natural persons can do.239 They can 
take on legal obligations, and when they do so, they cannot seek to avoid them by 
claiming that they are sovereign.240  
But, that conclusion is of little importance to Justice Wilson’s analysis, as he 
rejects Georgia’s claim to sovereignty in any case.241 First, he argues, the Constitution 
has no sovereign in one sense, because it creates a republican government with 
citizens, not subjects.242 Second, in a republic, sovereignty resides in the people.243 “As 
to the purposes of the Union, therefore, Georgia is NOT a sovereign state.”244 Finally, 
Georgia is obviously not sovereign in the sense that term has in the context of 
feudalism, because the feudal system “never extended to the American States.”245 
Justice Wilson next conducts a historical review even more searching than that of 
Justice Iredell, tracing notions of sovereignty back to the ancient Greeks.246 He finds 
various traditions, including those of the Spaniards of Aragon, England up to the time 
of Edward I, and Frederick the Great’s Prussia, in which the Crown was not above the 
law and could be sued even by a commoner.247 This discussion leads him to the 
conclusion that, for the purposes of the federal union, Georgia is not a sovereign at 
all.248 Indeed, Justice Wilson places the sovereignty of the Union itself at a lower rank 
than the sovereignty of the people of the United States.249  
Justice Wilson has no doubt that, as a matter of general political theory, the 
Constitution could vest power in the federal judiciary to hear a case between a state 
                                                          
 236  Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 457 (Wilson, J.). 
 237  See, e.g., id. at 456 (“Is the foregoing description of a State a true description? It will not 
be questioned but it is.”); id. (asking whether a state may escape its legal obligations by asserting 
its sovereignty and answering “Surely not”). 
 238  See id. at 455. 
 239  Id. 
 240  See id. at 455–56. 
 241  See id. at 457. 
 242  See id. at 456. 
 243  See id. at 457. 
 244  Id.  
 245  Id.  
 246  Id. at 459. 
 247  Id. at 458–61. 
 248  Id. at 461. 
 249  See id. at 462 (arguing that to toast the United States was not “politically correct;” one 
ought really to toast the “People of the United States”). 
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and a citizen of another state.250 Justice Wilson then questions whether the 
Constitution, empowered to do so, actually did create such jurisdiction.251 His initial 
interpretive methodology is intentionalist and purposive. He notes that the Articles of 
Confederation established no power to regulate individual citizens but only the 
states.252 “That defect was remedied by the national constitution,” Justice Wilson 
notes, but the Constitution does not strip the federal government of its power to 
regulate states as well as its citizens.253 Justice Wilson then determines that the 
Constitution in fact conveys jurisdiction over Chisholm’s case to the courts by virtue 
of the Constitution’s express “objects” and its “general texture.”254  
In his penultimate paragraph, Justice Wilson points out that the Constitution 
expressly creates federal jurisdiction over controversies between a state and a citizen 
of another state.255 He also echoes (without acknowledgment) Justice Blair’s reading 
that, if federal courts have jurisdiction over cases between states, one of those states 
must be the defendant.256 He had previously pointed to the Contracts Clause,257 which 
would be a meaningless provision if courts were not empowered to enforce it against 
states.258  
Justice Wilson’s methodology thus brings together textual, intentionalist, 
historical, and teleological modes of interpretation. However, Justice Wilson grounds 
his opinion not in law, but in political theory. While he and Justice Iredell both look 
to history, they reference completely different categories of history, and even where 
their opinions contradict one another, neither acknowledges the other’s arguments. 
The opinions pass in the night, having launched from different ports and sailed in 
opposite directions.  
4. Justice Cushing: Ipse Dixit Exemplified 
Justice Cushing rejects all appeals to history and bases his opinion solely on the 
constitutional text, which he reads as establishing the federal courts’ jurisdiction over 
the case.259 He dismisses, rather than reckons with, his colleagues approaches: “The 
point turns not upon the law or practice of England . . . nor upon the law of any other 
country whatever. . . .”260 He acknowledges, as did Justice Blair, the possibility that 
                                                          
 250  Id. at 464. 
 251  Id. 
 252  Id. 
 253  See id. at 464 (“[T]he people of the United States intended to bind the several States, by 
the Legislative power of the national Government.”). 
 254  See id. at 465 (including among the Constitution’s “objects” goals such as creating a 
more perfect union and establishing justice). 
 255  Id. at 466. 
 256  Id. 
 257  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts”).  
 258  Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 465 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
 259  Id. at 466–67 (opinion of Cushing, J.). 
 260  Id. at 466. 
34https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss4/7
2019] ORIGINALISM AND SECOND-ORDER IPSE DIXIT 593 
 
the Constitution intended to create jurisdiction only where the state was a plaintiff, but 
he rejects this reading of the Constitution for want of textual evidence in its favor.261  
Justice Cushing does directly respond to Justice Iredell’s concern that states will 
be reduced to the status of subordinate corporations.262  For Justice Cushing, the term 
“corporation” is not necessary.263 The main point is that the Constitution details the 
allocation of sovereign powers. It lodges many sovereign powers with Congress,264 
and it prohibits states from engaging in other activities associated with sovereignty. 265 
It may well be that states retain aspects of their sovereignty, but immunity to suit in 
federal courts has been eliminated by Article III’s express terms. Because the 
Constitution’s language clearly grants to courts jurisdiction over suits such as 
Chisholm’s, the states’ only recourse would be to make use of the amendment 
process.266 
Justice Cushing does not address or acknowledge Justice Iredell’s historical 
arguments;267 rather, he simply declares his contrary conclusion: 
A second question made in the case was, whether the particular action of 
assumpsit could lie against a State? I think assumpsit will lie, if any suit; 
provided a State is capable of contracting.268 
It would be hard to formulate a purer expression of ipse dixit reasoning. Justice 
Cushing has no interest in Justice Iredell’s arguments because he engages only in 
textual analysis. In this case, at least, he sees no need to look beyond the plain meaning 
of the text. 
5. Chief Justice Jay on Sovereignty Under the Constitution 
Like Justice Wilson, Chief Justice Jay was not disinterested in the outcome of 
Chisholm. He had no pecuniary interest in the case, but if Georgia prevailed, that 
outcome would make the Treaty of Paris, which Jay had helped negotiate, more 
difficult to implement.269 More generally, Jay joined the Court, in part, in order to 
                                                          
 261  Id. at 467; see also id. at 476 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (“If the Constitution really meant to 
extend these powers only to those controversies in which a State might be Plaintiff, to the 
exclusion of those in which citizens had demands against a State, it is inconceivable that it 
should have attempted to convey that meaning in words, not only so incompetent, but also 
repugnant to it.”). 
 262  Id. at 468 (opinion of Cushing, J.). 
 263  Id. 
 264  See id. (listing some of the powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution). 
 265  See id. (listing some of the limitations on state powers named in Article I, Section 10 of 
the Constitution). 
 266  See id. (“If the Constitution is found inconvenient in practice in this or any other 
particular, it is well that a regular mode is pointed out for amendment.”). 
 267  Casto thus calls Justice Cushing, like Justice Blair, “unimaginative.” CASTO, supra note 
66, at 192. 
 268  Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 469 (opinion of Cushing, J). 
 269  See Sandra Frances Van Burkleo, “Honor, Justice, and Interest:” John Jay’s Republican 
Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal Bench, in GERBER, SERIATIM, supra note 115, at 26, 
48 (“At issue was Georgia’s constitutional right to resist federal judicial power in a dispute 
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ensure the enforceability of the United States’ international obligations against the 
states.270 In Jay’s opinion, the nation properly provided for a national judiciary in order 
to address “evils” such as the delinquency of state courts in abiding by the international 
obligations of the United States.271  
The Chief Justice’s opinion begins by outlining the questions to be addressed: (1) 
Georgia’s status a sovereign state, (2) whether such a sovereign can be sued, and (3) 
whether the Constitution authorizes a suit such as Chisholm’s.272 Jay’s approach 
combines elements of the approaches of Justices Iredell and Wilson. He, like Wilson, 
focuses on the nature of sovereignty. Like Wilson, Jay treats individuals as the sources 
of sovereignty,273 but like Iredell he is interested ultimately only in the version of 
sovereignty embodied in the Constitution.274 That document, for Chief Justice Jay, is 
a compact among the people, who transferred many prerogatives to the federal 
government.275  
Chief Justice Jay contrasts European sovereignty, which resides in the princes who 
exercise it, with sovereignty under the Constitution, which resides in the people for 
whom governmental authorities act as agents.276 In addition, European sovereignty is 
based on feudal principles in which the people are subjects, not citizens.277 
Assumptions derived from European sovereignty are inapposite when applied to a 
compact among sovereign citizens.278  
Turning to the text of the Constitution, the Chief Justice combines purposive and 
textualist approaches, beginning with the Constitution’s Preamble,279 which he uses to 
identify the policy considerations underlying each grant of jurisdiction in Article III, 
Section 2.280 The text of Article III clearly seems to convey jurisdiction over 
Chisholm’s case, unless it is read to cover only cases in which the state is the plaintiff. 
The Chief Justice rejects this argument because, “[i]t is politic, wise, and good that, 
not only the controversies, in which a State is Plaintiff, but also those in which a State 
is Defendant, should be settled.”281 Returning to a form of textualism, the Chief Justice 
                                                          
involving the Paris peace, and thus to invite renewed conflict with Britain and fresh castigation 
of Americans in Europe.”). 
 270  Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1694. 
 271  Chisholm, 2 U.S. 419, 474 (1793) (opinion of Jay, J.). 
 272  Id. at 470. 
 273  See id. at 479 (affirming the “great and glorious principle, that the people are the 
sovereign of this country . . . .”). 
 274  Id. at 471. 
 275  See id. at 468 (pointing to various constitutional provisions as “a most essential 
abridgement of State sovereignty”).  
 276  Id. at 471. 
 277  Id. 
 278  Id. at 471–72; see also id. at 456–57 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (finding that Georgia can 
have no sovereign claims on its citizens and certainly not on citizens of another state). 
 279  Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 474–75 (opinion of Jay, J.). 
 280  Id. at 475–76. 
 281  Id. at 476. 
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then points out that, if the Framers meant to preclude federal courts from the exercise 
of jurisdiction over cases in which a state is the defendant, they could have expressly 
so stated.282 
On one point, the Chief Justice does engage Justice Iredell’s opinion directly. He 
does so not by specifically addressing Justice Iredell, but by simply stating an 
opposing view.283 Underlying Justice Iredell’s broad reading of state sovereignty is a 
canon of construction that delegations of sovereignty ought to be strictly construed.284 
Thus, because the Constitution does not state that its object was to make states 
amendable to suits in cases sounding in assumpsit, courts ought not to assume such an 
intention. Chief Justice Jay’s perspective is that the expansion of the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts to cover states is “remedial” and thus is to be “construed liberally.”285   
The Chief Justice’s opinion is unusual, in that it acknowledges a strong textual 
argument on the other side. If citizens can sue a state, they should also be able to sue 
the United States, as Article III uses similar language to create jurisdiction over suits 
involving states and suits involving the United States.286 The Chief Justice has no 
textual or even any legal argument in response. Rather, he simply maintains that, while 
the federal executive can enforce judgments against the states, there is no power that 
can enforce a decision against the federal government.287 He then concludes by 
apologizing for a hastily written opinion that cites neither cases nor other authority, 
but he assures his readers that “former Congresses and the State Conventions are 
replete with similar ideas.”288 Finally, he appeals to honesty, utility, and “the great 
moral truth, that justice is the same whether due from one man or a million.”289  
D. Ipse Dixit Reasoning in Seriatim Opinions 
From the modern perspective, it may seem that the swift passage of the Eleventh 
Amendment was a legislative overrule of Chisholm,290 proving that Justice Iredell got 
things right. However, that conclusion is by no means obvious. Kurt Lash has argued 
that the Eleventh Amendment was already in the works before Chisholm was 
                                                          
 282  Id. at 476–77. 
 283  Id. at 476. 
 284  See id. at 450 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (maintaining that “nothing but express words, or an 
insurmountable implication” would justify permitting a suit against a state); see also Lash, 
Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 122, at 1640–41 (elaborating on Iredell’s strict 
constructionist approach to limitation on sovereignty).  
 285  Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 476 (opinion of Jay, J.). Lash also notes the disagreement between 
Chief Justice Jay and Justice Iredell. See Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 122, at 
1635 (calling the Chief Justice’s approach “precisely the opposite of the rule of strict 
construction that excludes application of federal power against the states unless called for by 
express enumeration or unavoidable implication”). 
 286  Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 478 (opinion of Jay, J.). 
 287  Id.  
 288  Id.  
 289  Id. at 479. 
 290  See Orth, supra note 157, at 256 (noting that the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment 
took place less than two years after Chisholm was decided). 
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decided.291 As Randy Barnett points out, the passage of the Eleventh Amendment 
could signify that the Court correctly interpreted the Constitution, but the states 
decided that they did not like this consequence of the Constitution and so followed 
constitutional procedures for amendment.292 John Marshall observed in Fletcher v. 
Peck, that “[t]he [C]onstitution, as passed, gave the courts of the United States 
jurisdiction in suits brought against individual States.”293 Justice Wilson and Chief 
Justice Jay both rejected any notion that states could not be sued.294 Even Justice 
Iredell did not deny Congress’s power under the Constitution to create federal 
jurisdiction over suits like Chisholm.295  He simply did not think that Congress had 
done so in the Judiciary Act of 1789.296 He held, as a matter of statutory construction 
only, that states could not be sued.297 The outcome of the case turned on whether 
Justice Iredell was correct that the Constitution’s Article III is not self-executing. None 
of the other Justices addressed that claim directly. Justice Wilson came closest, but 
while Justice Iredell focused on the legacy of the English common law, Justice Wilson 
surveyed constitutional law dating back to the ancient Greeks.298 
The swift passage of the Eleventh Amendment indicates that the United States of 
1793 was not the United States of 1787, or even 1789. By 1793, the enthusiasm for 
Federalism had waned significantly.299 James Madison, a founding Federalist, was 
already collaborating with Thomas Jefferson to form the Democratic-Republican 
Party, the political opposition to what would become the Federalist Party.300 Attacks 
on Chisholm appeared in the partisan, anti-Federalist press.301  
The five opinions of the Court show that the Justices appeal to history, the 
constitutional text, read in light of the document’s purposes, and relevant political 
theory. They reference the intentions of the drafters or ratifiers without specifying 
which intentions matter, but they undertake no investigation into those intentions. 
                                                          
 291  Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail, supra note 123, at 1692 (“Chisholm occurred midway 
down the road to the Eleventh Amendment”). 
 292  Barnett, The People or the State?, supra note 13, at 1737. 
 293  10 U.S. 87, 139 (1810). 
 294  Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 466, 478 (opinions of Wilson, J. and Jay, J.) 
 295  See Orth, supra note 157, at 263 (noting Justice Iredell’s insistence that his decision was 
based on the statutory text and not on the Constitution). 
 296  Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 449 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 297  Id. at 436 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 298  Id. at 459 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
 299  See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788–1800 288 (1993) (describing the elections of 1792 as the first in the 
United States that were contested on a partisan basis, with republican interests aligned against 
those associated with the Hamiltonian, federalist Treasury Department). 
 300  See, e.g., id. at 257–302 (recounting the advent of political parties beginning late in 
1791); NOAH FELDMAN, THREE LIVES OF JAMES MADISON: GENIUS, PARTISAN, PRESIDENT 337–
71 (2017) (describing Madison’s founding of a democratic Republican party in opposition to 
Hamiltonian Federalism). 
 301  See POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER, supra note 156, at 72 (citing a critical editorial in 
The National Gazette, and other anti-Federalist sources). 
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Each Justice started from some principle that he stated rather than proved, and in their 
seriatim opinions, the Justices did not take up or refute each other’s principled stands. 
Ultimately, each Chisholm opinion turns on ipse dixit reasoning rather than on an 
appeal to evidence of the original meaning of the constitutional text or the original 
intentions of the Framers. 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EARLY COURT’S SECOND-ORDER IPSE 
DIXIT DECISIONS 
I have limited myself in this Article to a discussion of the practices of the pre-
Marshall Court. I have argued, and used the Chisholm case to illustrate, that the 
opinions of the pre-Marshall Court turned on second-order, ipse dixit reasoning. That 
reasoning was neither originalist nor non-originalist. The Court embraced a non-
hierarchical pluralism of interpretive approaches, and the opinions often turned on the 
resolution of meta-interpretive issues decided without reference to any components of 
the originalist toolkit and often based on commitments that sounded more in political 
theory or policy than in law. 
John Marshall transformed the U.S. Supreme Court. He eliminated seriatim 
opinions302 in favor of unanimous opinions, the most important of which he authored 
himself.303 But, he did not stray from the early Court’s non-hierarchical 
methodological pluralism, nor did he reduce the role of second-order ipse dixit 
reasoning in constitutional cases. Marshall’s approach to constitutional adjudication 
then in turn became the model that American courts followed at least until the Lochner 
Era. His contemporary, Joseph Story, suggested that Marshall’s epitaph should read: 
“here lies the expounder of the Constitution.”304 John Bradley Thayer’s assessment 
towards the turn of the twentieth century was that Marshall was preeminent in the field 
of constitutional law, “first, and with no second.”305   
Marshall’s strategy of authoring majority opinions strengthened the authority of 
the Court while sacrificing some transparency. Seriatim opinions make it easy to see 
the Justices’ meta-interpretive moves. Under Marshall, the Court conveyed an 
appearance of unanimity that suppressed evidence of rival approaches. Still, one can 
see from the briefs of counsel and the critiques of the Marshall Court’s opinions in the 
Republican press that Marshall’s approach was not the only one. His approach, like 
that of the Chisholm Court, was grounded in political commitments and assumptions 
about the nature of the Constitution that were asserted rather than reasoned.  
What we today would call originalist methods of constitutional interpretation, such 
as textualism and intentionalism, were part of the methodological toolkit available to 
                                                          
 302  See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–35 191 
(Abridged ed., 1991) (crediting Marshall with initiating the practice of writing the “opinion of 
the Court”); Charles F. Hobson, The Marshall Court (1801–1835): Law, Politics, and the 
Emergence of the Federal Judiciary, in THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF 
JUSTICE 47, 57 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005) (observing that opinions during the Marshall 
Court were “the product of collaborative deliberation, carried out in a spirit of mutual 
concession and accommodation”).  
 303  See WHITE, supra note 305, at 191 (stating that Marshall wrote 547 opinions, while his 
colleagues combined to write 574). 
 304  Quoted in JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION xi (1996); see 
id. at 2 (calling John Marshall’s great decisions “the ABCs of American constitutional law”). 
 305  JOHN BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 56–57 (1901). 
39Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019
2019] ORIGINALISM AND SECOND-ORDER IPSE DIXIT 598 
 
Justices during the Early Republic and into the nineteenth century. However, such 
approaches did not predominate. Reliance on text or on the Framers’ presumed 
intentions informed some opinions, but those opinions were also informed, at a more 
fundamental level, by perspectives that looked outside of the Constitution and beyond 
the law. The opinions turned on determinations made outside of the frame of their 
written opinions. Such second-order ipse dixit decisions were inevitable where the 
constitutional text provided inadequate guidance and the Framers disagreed among 
themselves as to its meaning. In the Early Republic, original meaning often ran out 
before constitutional interpretation began. The early Justices’ legal opinions issued 
from within a non-legal meta-interpretive frame. 
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